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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction. 
Petitioners have failed to file a timely petition for judicial 
review as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Does the court have jurisdiction where Petitioner fails 
to file a timely Petition for Review of Agency Action. 
The standard of review for this questions is correction of 
error. See Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664 
(Utah 1991) . 
II. Did the Utah State Tax Commission reasonably conclude 
that sales of sand and gravel from Harper Excavating, Inc. to 
Harper Contracting, Inc., were taxable transactions. 
The standard of review for this issue is the "abuse of 
discretion" standard pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(h)(i). 
Therefore, the reviewing court should affirm the agency's 
decision unless it is unreasonable. See Morton Int'l Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991).l 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative provisions are set forth verbatim in the 
attached appendix. 
. The Utah Administrative Procedure Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46-1 to -22 (1987), applies to this appeal inasmuch as all 
adjudicative proceedings below were commenced after January 1, 
1988. Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n, 819 P.2d 776 (Utah 
1991). 
STATUTES - Appendix Is 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(8) (1987). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (1987). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13) (1987). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987). 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(1)(a) (1987). 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On appeal, Harper Investments, Inc., Harper Sand and Gravel, 
Inc., Harper Excavating, Inc., and Harper Contracting, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Petitioners") challenge the Utah State Tax 
Commission's finding that Petitioners were required to collect 
and remit sales taxes with respect to inter-subsidiary sand and 
gravel sales. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
An audit conducted during 1988 determined that Petitioners 
were liable for sales and use taxes in the amount of $582,273.93 
from sales of sand and gravel. (R. 213, 685-693). Statutory 
notices of the deficiencies were sent September 28, 1990. (R. 
213, 685-693). Petitioners filed a combined Petition for 
Redetermination on October 26, 1990. (R. 11-39). 
On July 30, 1991, the parties presented evidence before the 
Utah State Tax Commission. (Transcript). On January 9, 1992, 
2 
the Tax Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Final Decision affirming the Auditing Division's 
assessment of sales tax, interest, and penalties. (R. 207-213). 
Petitioners did not file a request for reconsideration of 
the Tax Commission's Final Decision within 20 days from the 
issuance of the January 9, 1992, Final Decision as required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(1)(a). (Respondent's Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion to Dismiss, 2). Furthermore, Petitioners 
did not file a petition for review of final agency action within 
30 days of the Tax Commission's Final Decision as required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a). (Respondent's Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion to Dismiss, 2). 
On February 24, 1992, Petitioners filed a motion with the 
Tax Commission, relying on Utah R. App. P. 4(e), requesting the 
Tax Commission to extend the time allowed for filing an appeal 
from the Final Decision. (Respondent's Memorandum in Support of 
its Motion to Dismiss, 2). On March 13, 1992, Petitioners filed 
an amended motion seeking permission to file a tardy petition for 
reconsideration. (R. 40). On April 15, 1992, the Tax Commission 
granted Petitioners permission to file a tardy petition for 
reconsideration. (R. 30). 
On May 4, 1992, Petitioners filed their Petition for 
Reconsideration of the Tax Commission's Final Decision dated 
January 9, 1992. (R. 11). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
13(3)(b) a request for reconsideration is considered denied if 
3 
the agency does not issue an order within 20 days of the filing 
of the request* Time for filing an appeal of final agency action 
is from the time the order "is considered to have been issued 
under subsection 63-46b-13(3) (b). •• Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
14(3)(b). On June 3, 1992, the Tax Commission issued an order 
confirming that the petition for reconsideration was denied• (R. 
8-9). On July 1, 1992, 147 days after the Commission's Final 
Order, and 38 days after Petitioners tardy motion for 
reconsideration was deemed denied, Petitioners filed a Petition 
for Review of Agency Action with the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah. (R. 2). 
On January 20, 1993, Respondent filed a Motion To Dismiss 
for Lack of Jurisdiction for failure to file a timely appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a). On April 20, 1993, 
the Court denied the motion, reserving ruling on the issues 
presented until plenary presentation pursuant to Rule 10(f) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prior to 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. operated a sand 
and gravel company that excavated, processed, hauled, and laid 
sand, gravel, and other materials. (R. at 208). 
2. In May of 1986, in an attempt to limit legal 
liabilities, Rulon Harper, president of the parent and eventual 
subsidiary corporations, decided to reorganize the corporation by 
dividing and transferring the assets of Harper Excavating, Inc. 
4 
into three new, wholly owned subsidiaries, namely: Harper Sand 
and Gravel, Inc., Harper Excavating, Inc., and Harper 
Contracting, Inc., (R. at 208, 567). 
3. The former Harper Excavating, Inc. changed its name to 
Harper Investments, Inc., and became the parent corporation of 
the three new and separate subsidiaries as a part of the 
reorganization. (R. at 208, 567). 
4. At the close of business May 9, 1986, the listed assets 
and liabilities of Harper Excavating, Inc. were divided and 
allocated among the three new and separate entities by the 
controller of the former Harper Excavating, Inc., Steven Goddard. 
(R. at 208, 567; T. 66, Respondent's Exhibit 16 p. 6). 
5. The gravel sales contracts between Rulon Harper and 
Harper Excavating, Inc. were not listed as an asset of Harper 
Excavating at the time reorganization occurred. (T. 49, 80 & 
85). 
6. Consequently, the rights created under those arguments 
were not assigned to any of the newly formed corporations. (T. 
85). 
7. A computerized accounting system was installed to 
facilitate the accounting procedures of each of the new 
subsidiaries, given the fact that each corporation performed 
separate business functions. (R. at 240, 568). This system 
accounted for expenses and revenue by job, by gravel pit, by 
labor, and by equipment. (R. 645). 
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8. The financial statements do not refer to the gravel 
sales agreements, nor do they list them as an asset of any of the 
corporations. (Respondent's Exhibits 15-27, T. 85, 124, 125 & 
127). 
9. Following the reorganization, Harper Sand and Gravel, 
Inc. purchased sand and gravel from land owned by Rulon Harper. 
(T. 85, 86 & 127, Respondent's Exhibits 17 p.7, 21 p.9). 
10. Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. paid Rulon Harper 
royalties for extracting gravel from pits owned by Rulon Harper 
(Respondent's Exhibits 2, 3, 21 p. 9, T. 28, 39, 86, 137 & 141). 
11. Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. continues to sell sand and 
gravel purchased from Rulon Harper to outside vendors. (T. 102 & 
127). 
12. During the audit period, Harper Excavating, Inc. would 
purchase sand and gravel from Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. (R. 
209, T. 61, Respondent's Exhibits 18 p. 9, 22 p. 9, 26 p. 10). 
13. Harper Excavating, Inc. would sell the sand to and haul 
it for Harper Contracting, Inc. (R. 209, T. 61, Respondent's 
Exhibits 18 p. 9, 19 p. 9, 22 p. 6, 23 p. 7 & 9, 25 p. 8, 10, 27 
p. 8-11). 
14. The sale from Harper Excavating, Inc. to Harper 
Contracting, Inc. was a taxable transaction. (R. 211, T. 138). 
15. Steven Goddard presented numerous invoices, statements, 
and checks that reflected inter-subsidiary transactions of sand 
and gravel between Harper Excavating, Inc. and Harper 
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Contracting, Inc. to Rulon Harper for his signature during the 
audit period. (T. at 22, 60). 
16. Rulon Harper signed the checks that paid for the sand 
and gravel and its transportation costs for each sand and gravel 
transaction as described in the purchase scenario above. (R. at 
248, 249; T. at 22, 61). 
17. The independent auditing firm of Sorensen, Main and 
Nielsen, which conducted yearly audits of the Harper 
corporations, noted the transactions in the financial statements 
prepared for each corporation. (Respondent's Exhibits 15-28). 
18. No sales taxes were collected or paid on any of the 
sand and gravel sales and hauling charges among the different 
corporations. (R. at 209). 
19. In the latter part of 1988, the Auditing Division of 
the Utah State Tax Commission conducted an audit of the 
Petitioners for the period ranging from October 1, 1985 through 
September 30, 1988. (R. at 209, 210). 
20. The audits uncovered a deficiency of $582,273.93, 
excluding interest and penalties, in sales and use taxes 
primarily relating to sand and gravel sales between Harper 
Excavating, Inc. and Harper Contracting, Inc. during the period 
in question. (R. at 238). 
21. In September of 1990, the Utah State Tax Commission 
issued statutory notices to Petitioners, which reflected the 
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sales taxes owing on the inter-subsidiary sand and gravel 
transactions. (R. 684-696). 
22. On July 30, 1991, both parties presented evidence and 
testimony regarding the sales tax assessment at a hearing before 
the Tax Commission. (T. 1-152). 
23. On January 9, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision, which 
affirmed the tax assessment, interest and penalties against the 
Harper corporations. (R. 207-214). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioners' failure to file a timely appeal deprives this 
Court of jurisdiction. The Tax Commission issued its Final 
Decision on January 9, 1992. Petitioners did not petition for 
reconsideration of final agency decision by filing with the Tax 
Commission within twenty days of the Final Decision or file for 
judicial review within 30 days. 
The Tax Commission's hearing of a tardy petition for 
reconsideration had no effect on the finality of the January 9, 
1992 Final Decision. To conclude otherwise would grant the Tax 
Commission power to extend the time for seeking judicial review 
contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9). Therefore, Petitioners 
appeal is untimely and should be dismissed. 
Sales between a parent and a subsidiary corporation, or 
between two subsidiaries, are subject to sales tax. Each 
entity, has a separate legal existence. As such, the Tax 
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Commission reasonably determined that the transactions between 
Harper Excavating, Inc. and Harper Contracting, Inc. were 
taxable. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONERS FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY APPEAL. 
Pursuant to the provisions in the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, a party <an obtain judicial review of a final 
agency action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 64-46b-14; and, agency 
reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 64-46b-13. 
In order to obtain judicial review of a final agency action 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14, a party must file a 
petition for judicial review within 30 days from the date the 
decision was issued or is considered to be issued. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989). This Court has ruled that an 
order is "issued" when it has been signed by f he Commission. See 
Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 
1992). In the case at bar, the Tax Commission issued its Final 
Decision on January 9, 1992. Petitioners did not file a request 
for review within 30 days. Pursuant to the express language of § 
63-46b-14(3)(a) and Utah R. App. P. 14(a), a petition for review 
must be filed within 30 days of the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision. Therefore, because Petitioners failed to timely file, 
9 
this Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioners' appeal and it 
should be dismissed.2 
The Tax Commission's granting of Petitioners' untimely 
MMotion to Extend Time for Filing Notice of Appeal3" does not 
extend the time allowed for judicial review of the January 9, 
1992 Final Decision. Section 63-46b-l(9) specifically states 
that an agency does not have the authority to extend the time 
requirements allowed for judicial review. See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-l(9) (1989 & Supp. 1992). This Court recently held that 
the Tax Commission cannot expand the time period established for 
2
. Failure to file a timely appeal is jurisdictional in 
nature and can be raised at any time during the appellate 
proceedings. See Leonczynski v. Indus. Comm'n., 713 P.2d 706 
(Utah 1985) . 
3
 A brief synopsis of the procedural history of relevant 
parts this case may be helpful. 
January 9, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its Final 
Decision. (R. 207). 
February 24, 1992, Petitioners filed a Motion to Extend Time 
For Filing Notice of Appeal. (R. 165). 
March 13, 1992, Petitioners filed an Amended Motion For 
Relief to Challenge the Final Decision of the Tax 
Commission. (R. 40). 
April 15, 1992, the Tax Commission granted Petitioners' 
Motion for Extend Time for Filing of Appeal. (R. 30). 
May 4, 1992, Petitioners filed a Petition for 
Reconsideration of the Tax Commission's January 9, 
1992, Final Decision. (R. 11). 
June 3, 1992, the Tax Commission denied Petitioners' 
Petition for Reconsideration. 
July 1, 1992, Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of 
Agency Action regarding the June 3, 1992 denial of 
Petitioner's Petition for Reconsideration and also of the January 
9, 1992, Final Order. (R. 2). 
10 
judicial review. See Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1992). Petitionees failed to file- a petition 
for judicial review of the January 9, 1992, Final Decision within 
the 30 day time limit. The subsequent denial of Petitioners' 
tardy Request for Reconsideration does not have the effect of 
reviving Petitioners' rights to obtain judicial review as to the 
January 9, 1992 Final Decision. 
The Utah Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in 
Hase v. Hase, 775 P.2d 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Hase involved 
an appeal from a district court decision, but its reasoning is 
applicable to the facts of the case at bar. In Hase the court 
issued a final divorce decree on December 31, 1987, which 
disposed of all the Petitioner's claims. On January 15, 1989, 
the Petitioner filed a tardy "Objection to Order" pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). On February 5, 1988, the district court 
issued a "consolidated findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
decree of divorce and order." Petitioner then filed an appeal on 
March 4, 1988. 
The Petitioner in Hase argued that its appeal was timely 
since it was filed within 30 days of the district court's 
February 5, 1988 decision. The Utah Court of Appeals rejected 
this argument by stating: 
The Consolidated Decree of Divorce and Orders 
merely reiterated what the court had 
previously ordered in several different 
orders, referred to those orders specifically 
by date in most instances, and joined them in 
11 
one document, as appellants requested. We 
find that such an order cannot be used to 
extend the time for appeal because it does 
not resolve any issues extant, but merely 
refers to prior orders of the court. Thus 
the Consolidated Decree of Divorce and Orders 
does not constitute an appealable final 
order. 
Id. at 945. (Emphasis added). 
The Petitioner in Hase also argued that its tardy "Objection 
to Order" should stay the 30 day filing requirement for an 
appeal. The court of appeals rejected this argument as well 
stating that because the objection was not filed within 10 days 
as required, the objection did not qualify as a post-judgment 
order, which would have suspended the time for appealing the 
December 31, 1987 final order. Id.; see also Burgers v. Maiben, 
652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982) (a tardy request for a new trial cannot 
stay the time limits imposed upon appeals); Vanionora v. Draper, 
30 Utah 2d 364, 517 P.2d 1320 (1974) (failure to file motion for 
a new trial does not stay the time constraints governing 
appeals). 
Both the relevant statutes and the cited case law support 
the proposition that the agency has no authority to extend the 
time for judicial review. In the case at bar, Petitioners failed 
to petition for judicial review within the 30 day time limit. 
Therefore, the Tax Commission's subsequent denial of Petitioners' 
12 
untimely request cannot resurrect Petitioners' right to appeal 
the January 9, 1992 Final Decision/ 
Even if the Tax Commission could extend the time period for 
filing a request for reconsideration and thus extend the time for 
judicial review, Petitioners' appeal is still untimely pursuant 
to section 63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Code. Under § 63-46b-
13(3)(b) an order denying a request for reconsideration is deemed 
to be issued 20 days after the filing of the request if the 
agency has taken no action. 
In the case at bar, although the Tax Commission eventually 
issued a decision confirming the denial on June 3, 1992, the Tax 
Commission failed to t IRP rut) action on Petitioners' request 
within the 20 day time period. Consequently, according to § 63-
46b-13(3)(b) Petitioners' request is deemed denied as of May 25, 
1992, 20 days after filing. In order to preserve their rights to 
judicial review, Petitioners would have had to file petition for 
review within 30 days of May 25, 1992, ie. June 24, 1992. The 
record indicates that Petitioners filed their petition for 
judicial review on July 1, 1992, which is clearly beyond the 30 
day time limit set out in § 63-46b-14(3)(a)• (R. 2). 
A
. Federal Courts have long recognized that tardy motions 
for reconsideration cannot toll the statute of limitations 
governing appeals even if the trial court hears the motion for 
reconsideration. See Denlev v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 733 
F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir. 
1988); Martinez v. Trainer, 556 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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This Court has strictly enforced the time requirements for 
the filing of an appeal. In Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 
(Utah 1983), this Court refused to extend the 30 day time limit 
for filing an appeal that was filed 2 days beyond the time limit. 
Likewise, in Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 
7 (Utah 1992), this Court also held that the 30 day time limit 
runs from the date of issuance of the final decision, not the 
date of notice to the parties. 
The Tax Commission issued its Final Decision on January 9, 
1992. Petitioner did not file a petition for judicial review 
within 30 days as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14. The 
Commission does not have discretion to extend the time for 
judicial review. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9). Even if the 
denial of Petitioners' untimely motion for reconsideration is a 
final appealable order, separate and apart from the January 9 
order, Petitioners failed to timely file from the date the motion 
was deemed denied under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(a). 
This Court should therefore find that it lacks jurisdiction 
and dismiss Petitioners' appeal as untimely. 
II. INTERCOMPANY SALES OF SAND AND GRAVEL ARE TAXABLE 
TRANSACTIONS. 
"There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid 
or charged for . . • retail sales of tangible personal property 
made within the state." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1987). A 
retail is a sale to a "user or consumer." Utah Code Ann. § 59-
14 
12-102(8)(a). Harper Excavating, Inc. sold, hauled, and 
delivered sand and gravel to Harper Contracting, Inc. (R. 209, 
Respondent's Exhibits 18 p. 8., 19 p <>, 2 2 p. 6, 23 pp. 7 & 9, 26 
pp. 8 h 111, 27 pp. 8 k 11 ) Harper Contracting, Inc. issued 
checks to Harper Excavating, Inc. paying for the sand and gravel 
used in performing its contracts. (T. 131-136). Sales of sand 
and gravel from one entity to a separate, albeit a related 
entity, are taxable. Hales Sand and Gravel v. State Tax Comm'n, 
200 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1992). This is true despite the claims 
that the two corporations are "the same entity for tax purposes." 
Id. at 7. 
Once an entity elects to operate as a corporation, that 
entity must accept all responsibilities that attend to the 
corporate form. Institutional Laundry, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1985); see also Qgden Union Railway 
and Depot Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57 
(1964), modified on rehearing, 16 Utah 2d 255, 399 P.2d 145 
(1965); Cal-Metal Corp. v. California State Board of Ed., 161 
Cal. App. 3d 759, 207 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1984). In Institutional 
Laundry a subsidiary company, Institutional, claimed that the 
laundry service transactions between itself and its parent were 
not taxable because as a subsidiary, it had no separate legal 
existence. However, this Court held that a corporation, be it a 
parent or subsidiary, has its own legal status and existence, and 
that transactions between a parent corporation and its 
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subsidiaries are taxable. Institutional Laundry, 706 P.2d at 
1067. 
In response to Institutional's argument that as a subsidiary 
it had no separate corporate existence, this Court stated: 
A corporation, be it parent or subsidiary, 
has its own identity and existence. Common 
ownership or control does not automatically 
destroy that separate identity. Although in 
appropriate cases equity may look through the 
corporate shell to its alter-ego to prevent 
fraud or wrongdoing, the general rule still 
applies that corporations are separate legal 
entities bound by obligations as well as the 
benefits . . . . 
Having elected to operate as a corporation, 
for whatever benefits that separate status 
conferred upon Institutional and its parent, 
Institutional must also accept the tax burden 
and responsibility attendant to its corporate 
form. A corporation may not disregard or 
shed its corporate clothing to avoid tax 
consequences. 
Id. at 1067. 
Here, the Tax Commission found that the former Harper 
Excavating, Inc. attempted to limit its legal liability by 
dividing itself and allocating its assets among three separate 
subsidiaries. Each of the corporations performed different 
functions and tasks. Although some managerial overlap existed, 
the subsidiaries remained separate and distinct. As such, the 
Tax Commission reasonably concluded that the corporations were 
separate, that each must bear the responsibilities attendant to 
separate corporate existence. (R. 210-211). 
The Tax Commission noted: 
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The primary reason for reorganization was to 
establish three separate legal entities in 
attempt to limit the potential liability from 
a then pending lawsuit. It is inconsistent 
for the Petitioner on the one hand to argue 
that each of the companies was a separate, 
independent legal entity and thus insulated 
from the liability of either of the others, 
yet on the other hand argue that the three 
companies are so interrelated that any 
transactions between them merely constitute 
intracompany transactions and not taxable 
transactions. 
(R. 212). The Tax Commission's conclusion is consistent with the 
reasoning in the Institutional Laundry case, namely, once the 
choice is made as to whether a company will exist as an 
independent corporation, it must live with the burdens as well as 
the benefits. Institutional Laundry, 706 P.2d at 1067. The 
Commission's decision is also consistent with other 
jurisdictions, which have likewise held that sales between a 
parent and a subsidiary were subject to tax. See Standard 
Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Jackson, 735 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1987); 
Commissioner of Revenue v. Globe Automatic Vending Co., Inc., 421 
N.E.2d 1213, 1214 (Mass. 1981). 
In a case similar to the one at brji, 1 his Court held sand 
and gravel sales between two inter-related companies constituted 
taxable transactions. See Hales Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 199?) In Hales Sand and 
Gravel the sand and gravel contractor, Hales, sold materials to 
JTN Construction. JTN is a subcontracting corporation formed by 
three of Hales' shareholders in order to obtain federal 
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contracts. Hales argued that because the Utah Department of 
Transportation determined that the two corporations constituted a 
single unit for the purposes of federal contracts, Hales should 
not be liable for sand and gravel sales taxes between itself and 
JTN. This Court rejected Hales' argument and affirmed the Tax 
Commission's finding that Hales and JTN were separate legal 
entities and that the transactions were subject to sales tax. 
Id. at 7. 
Petitioners ignore the two Utah cases directly on point 
Institutional Laundry and Hales Sand and Gravel and instead rely 
upon the definition of a person in the former Sales Tax Act, 59-
15-2(1) (1986). That section states: 
A 'person' includes any individual, firm, 
copartnership, joint adventure, corporation, 
estate, or trust, or any group or combination 
acting as a unit and in the plural as well as 
a singular number unless the intention to 
give a more limited meaning is disclosed by 
context. (Emphasis added) 
In construing similar statutes this Court has applied the 
familiar rule of statutory construction "ejusdem generis." 
Ponderosa One v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 
635, 637 (Utah 1987). That maxim states: 
Where general words follow specific words in 
a statutory enumeration, the general words 
are construed to embrace only objects similar 
in nature to those objects enumerated by the 
proceeding specific words• 
Sutherland, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.17 
(Singer 5th ed 1992). The rule accomplishes the purposes of 
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giving effect to both the particular and general words by 
treating the particular words as indicating the class and the 
general words as extending the provisions of the statute to 
everything embraced in that class, though not specifically named 
by the particular words. Jjd. at 189. 
Using this framework, a limited liability company would be a 
"person" under the definition since it is of the same type or 
class as the specific words listed but is not among the specific 
designations. In the instance case, Petitioners are each 
corporations. They fall within the specific portion of the 
definition. Being specifically enumerated there is no question 
that each corporation is a "person" for purposes of the Sales Tax 
Act. Even the language of the statute limits the general language 
by stating "unless the intention to give a more limited meaning 
is disclosed by the context."5 
Petitioners' argument requires several leaps beyond their 
initial interpretation of the statute. The first leap is to the 
3
 This language was eliminated in the 1987 amendment which 
defines person as follows: 
Person includes any individual, firm, 
partnership, joint venture, association, 
corporation, estate, trust, business trust, 
receiver, syndicate, this state, any county, 
city, municipality, district or other 
governmental entity of the state, or any 
group or combination acting as a unit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(5) (1987). 
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definition of vendor in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(15) (1987) 
which states: 
Vendor means any person receiving any payment 
or consideration upon a sale of tangible 
personal property or any other taxable item 
or service under subsection 59-12-103(1), or 
to whom such payment or consideration is 
payable. (Emphasis added) 
Clearly for sales tax purposes any person receiving payment is 
the "vendor." In this instance, the "vendor" which received 
consideration upon the sale of tangible personal property was 
Harper Excavating, Inc. The duties of a vendor are set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107. Petitioners' argue that since the 
definition of vendor includes the term "person" and since the 
duties of vendors include filing returns (§ 59-12-107(4)(b)), 
that Petitioners were justified in filing what they deemed to be 
"consolidated returns."6 The Sales and Use Tax Act does not 
provide for "consolidated returns." That is a concept borrowed 
from corporate franchise tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-124. It 
does not apply to sales tax. Under the Sales Tax Act "each 
vendor" is required to file. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(1)(a). 
Even if Petitioners' argument is taken at face value the 
mere filing of "consolidated returns" does not eliminate the 
separate corporate identity. This Court has recently analyzed 
the effect of filing a consolidated return in Savage Indus., Inc. 
6
 Petitioners' "consolidated returns" were actually 
individual returns for each corporation listing all of the 
liability on one return and zeros on the others. (T. 111.) 
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v. State Tax Comm'n, 811 P. 2d 664 (Utah 1991). In interpreting 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-108(14) (f) (1987), which prohibits an 
acquiring corporation from using pre-acquisition losses of an 
acquired corporation, the Court stated that "corporations filing 
such returns maintain their separate identities although a single 
tax is calculated for the group." Id. at 10. Thus, even if the 
Utah Sales and Use Tax Act did provide that Petitioners could 
file a consolidated return, it would be irrelevant in determining 
the Petitioners' sales and use tax liability. 
Petitioners assertion that the Tax Commission "conceded" 
that the Petitioners are "group acting as a unit" for the 
purposes of filing consolidated tax returns is disingenuous. 
Petitioners cite the prehearing order. (Petitioners' Brief at 
24). The prehearing order merely states the issues as raised by 
Petitioners. This cannot be construed as a "concession" by any 
standard. Likewise, the manner in which Petitioners may have 
elected to file cannot be construed as an "admission" by the 
Commission. The Commission cannot prevent improper filings. 
Petitioners assert that someone at the Tax Commission confirmed 
that Petitioners were a group or combination acting as a unit 
based on Mr. Goddard's vague recollection that he telephoned a 
general number for some general clarification. (T. 54 & 55). An 
undocumented response without any knowledge of the question asked 
can not be binding on the Tax Commission. A telephone 
conversation to receive answers to general inquires is clearly 
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not an agency determination that would be binding under the 
standards set by UAPA. Under UAPA, an agency's determination are 
not even binding on the agency itself, so long as the agency 
justifies that its departure from prior practices by giving facts 
and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rationale basis for the 
inconsistency. Hales Sand & Gravel, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46B-16H(ii); See also BJ Titan Services 
v. State Tax Comm'n. 183 Utah Adv. Rep 20, 26 (1992). Initial 
acceptance of the returns does not prevent correction by audit as 
in the instant case. Therefore, the Tax Commission properly 
concluded that even though Petitioners "may indeed have filed a 
consolidated sales tax return," that Petitioners should have 
reported the transactions between Harper Excavating, Inc. and 
Harper Contracting, Inc. as taxable sales. (R. 212). 
Petitioners assertion that they have "reasonably 
interpreted" the Sales and Use Tax Act must be disregarded where 
their interpretation ignores controlling case law. Petitioners 
"reasonable" explanation does not explain how the definition of 
"person" leads to the conclusion that acts between related 
corporation are not taxable. Petitioners tortured construction 
of the statutes can not excuse them from the negligence penalty 
imposed where there are clear pronouncements of this court 
directly on point. 
III. SALES TAXES WERE PROPERLY ASSESSED ON THE 
TRANSACTIONS. 
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Petitioners' voluminous accounting ledgers and canceled 
checks conclusively indicate that retail sand and gravel 
transactions occurred between the separate entities. (T. 142-
143). Here, Petitioners urge this Court to totally disregard 
these transactions and to have this Court look only to the 
"revised" financial reports. (Petitioners' Brief at 29, 30, 33). 
The Court should find difficulty with this request. In essence, 
Petitioners argue that an after-the-fact adjustment of their 
financial records should enable them to be exempt despite the 
fact that over a three year period taxable transactions occurred. 
Petitioners argue that the audit is based merely on ledger 
entries that "record but do not create facts." See, e.g., Loftis 
v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A 725, 728 (1927). However, this case, 
among others, also supports the general rule regarding the 
treatment of business records: courts generally consider such 
records as prima facie evidence of the facts they state. See One 
In All Corporation v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 132 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1963); (business records when admitted under statute become 
prima facie evidence); Frederick J. O'Reilly, v. Cellco Indus., 
Inc., 402 A.2d 686 (Pa. 1978) (corporate ledgers were properly 
admitted to determine the amount of unauthorized advances). 
The tax in this case is not based on mere paper 
transactions, but on real, concrete exchanges of tangible 
personal property for consideration between separate corporate 
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entities. There is no question that separate corporations were 
created. There is no question that Harper Sand & Gravel, Inc. 
actually extracted gravel, processed, washed, stacked and sold 
the gravel to Harper Excavating, Inc. (R. 117, 118, 209). 
Harper also sold sand and gravel to other entities and continues 
to do so. (Respondent's Exhibit 17 p. 3, T. 102). Harper Sand & 
Gravel, Inc. paid pit royalties to Rulon Harper for the rights to 
extract the gravel sold. (Respondent's Exhibits 2 and 3, T. 27, 
85, 86, 141). Harper Excavating, Inc. sold processed sand and 
gravel to Harper Contracting, Inc. (R. 209, T. 61, Respondent's 
Exhibits 18 p. 9, 22 p. 9, 26 p. 10). Harper Contracting, Inc. 
failed to pay tax on its purchases of sand and gravel from Harper 
Excavating, Inc. as well as its purchases from other vendors. 
(R. 211, 341-346). 
The transactions between Harper Excavating, Inc. and Harper 
Contracting, Inc. were no different then the transactions between 
Harper Contracting, Inc. and other vendors. This is not a 
situation where nothing happened but mere book entries. Physical 
exchanges of tangible personal property for consideration 
occurred over an extended period of time. Petitioners attempt to 
characterize these as mere accounting errors does not alter the 
fact that gravel was excavated, processed, hauled, delivered, 
sold, paid for and consumed. Petitioners after-the-fact 
characterizations of these transactions do not make them exempt 
from taxation. 
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Petitioners have attempted to reconstruct their records to 
eliminate any taxable transactions. These "restated" financial 
records do not reflect the transactions that actually took place 
and are based upon the assumption that an "erroneous" assignment 
of the assets of Harper Excavating, Inc. was made at the time of 
the corporate reorganization. In support of its contention, 
Petitioner's offer assignment agreements which purport to assign 
real property rights to Harper Contracting, Inc. (R. 584). 
These assignments do not effect the taxability of the 
transactions which occurred nor do they justify reliance on the 
"restated" financial statements created by Petitioners 
specifically for the hearing. 
First, no "erroneous assignment" of the rights described in 
the assignment agreement took place. Although the gravel sale 
agreements between Rulon Harper and Harper Excavating, Inc, dated 
February 25, 1985, purport to create an interest in real 
property, they were not notarized, recorded, nor were they listed 
as an asset on the books of Harper Excavating, Inc. at the time 
of reorganization. (R. 572-643, T. 80 & 85). The comptroller, 
Steven Goddard, testified that he "took a list of everything we 
had, everything that was previously an asset or a liability of 
Harper Excavating, Inc. and I divided them up." (T. 66). Any 
rights created by the gravel sale agreement were not listed as an 
asset of Harper Excavating, Inc. and therefore could not have 
been "erroneously assigned" to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. (T. 
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85). In fact, Goddard testified that the sand and gravel was not 
listed as an asset of any of the companies on reorganization. 
(T. 85). 
The assumption that Harper Sand & Gravel, Inc. was 
"erroneously assigned" the same real property interest 
purportedly created by the "secret" gravel sales agreement simply 
is not supported by the record. The record clearly shows that 
the gravel sale agreements did not appear as an asset of Harper 
Excavating, Inc. prior to reorganization. (T. 85). Steven 
Goddard testified that he took the list of the company's assets 
and reassigned them to the newly created companies. (T. 66). 
The assets do not appear on the financial statements of any of 
the companies for any of the years in question. (Respondent's 
Exhibits 15-27, T. 80, 81 & 85). The only record evidence that 
supports the assumption that any rights created by the gravel 
sale agreements were erroneously assigned to Harper Sand and 
Gravel, Inc. is contained on page 50 of the transcript, where it 
states: 
Question: Now it was a fact, wasn't it that 
you determined from the accounting stand 
point, it made sense to assume that the sand 
and gravel company would own whatever there 
was to own as far as the — the pits? 
Answer: Yea. I mean, how could it sell 
something that it didn't have. 
Question: Well, that's right. So you assumed 
it should have those assets 'cuz it was the 
"sand and gravel company?" 
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Answer: Correct. 
This exchange is consistent with Goddard's testimony that 
whatever sand and gravel assets were on the books were assigned 
to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc.. Goddard testified that he had 
never seen the gravel sales agreements and that they were not 
listed as an asset. (T. 49, 85). Therefore, any reference that 
the gravel sale agreements were "erroneously assigned" must be 
read in light of the foregoing facts. 
Petitioners brief and arguments below center on the 
assumption that the rights created by the gravel sale agreements 
and purportedly assigned to Harper Contracting, Inc. by Rulon 
Harper the day after the corporate organization were somehow 
erroneously assigned to Harper Sand and Gravel. This assumption 
is not correct. All of the evidence in the record indicat' that 
Goddard had no knowledge of either the gravel sale agreements or 
any assignments thereof and could not have assigned those rights 
in error. Therefore, Petitioners "restated" financial records 
are based upon a faulty premise. 
There is likewise no evidence in the record to support 
Petitioners' assumption that the gravel purchased by Harper 
Contracting, Inc. came from the pits covered by the assignments. 
Petitioners maintained a complex accounting system recording each 
transaction by truck and by gravel pit. (R. 646). Therefore, 
this information was available to Petitioners and could have been 
presented by Petitioners if it would have supported their 
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assumption. As the record stands, Petitioner's offered nothing 
to support their assumption that the gravel purchased by Harper 
Contracting, Inc. came from pits identified in the gravel sale 
agreements. After the reorganization, Harper Sand and Gravel, 
Inc. continued to purchase sand and gravel from Rulon Harper. 
(T. 85). Rulon Harper owned the pits where the gravel is and was 
being extracted. (T. 80). This is demonstrated by the following 
exchange between Gene Nielson, Petitioner's CPA, and Commissioner 
Pacheco (T. 127): 
Commissioner Pacheco: There is not — I 
just looked through the financial statements, 
there's not a land account in the financial 
statements, nor could I find land in any of 
the two subsidiaries. Now, where would the -
- where would you think that the land, — 
where the sale of the sand and gravel would 
come if there is no land account in any of 
these companies? 
The witness: OK. The land is owned by 
Rulon Harper personally. 
Commissioner Pacheco; That's what you know 
now. 
The witness: And it was at the time also, 
and we knew that. 
Commissioner Pacheco: Alright. So it 
wasn't a question of who owned the land at 
the inception, it was only the assignment 
that you were not aware of? 
The witness: Right. 
Rulon Harper owned gravel pits not covered by the assignments. 
(R. 572, 588, 603, 617, 632). Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. 
continued to purchase sand and gravel from pits owned by Rulon 
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Harper. (T. 85, 127). It paid pit royalties to Rulon Harper for 
the use of this gravel. (Respondent's Exhibits 2 & 3, T. 27, 
137). Even after the purported "discovery" of the assignments, 
Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. stills sells sand and gravel to 
third parties. (T. 102). Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. sold sand 
and gravel during the audit period and is still selling sand and 
gravel that it purchases from Rulon Harper. (Id.), Rulon Harper 
owned the land the sand and gravel was taken from then and owns 
it now. (T. 127). 
Harper Contracting, Inc., apparently with full knowledge of 
any rights that may have been created by the assignment, signed 
by its president7, contracted with Harper Excavating, Inc. for 
the purchase and delivery of gravel. (Respondent's Exhibit 19 p. 
9). Harper Contracting, Inc. also purchased sand and gravel from 
third parties during this period. (R. 339-347). All of these 
transactions were taxable. (Id.). The record .is clear that 
regardless of any rights that may have been created by such an 
assignment, Harper Contracting, Inc. purchased substantial 
amounts of gravel from both Harper Excavating, Inc. and other 
vendors during the audit period. (T. 61, Petitioner's Exhibits 
15-29, R. 339-347). 
7
 The knowledge of a corporations president is imputed to 
the corporation. See City of Arkansas City v. Anderson, 762 P.2d 
183, 189 (Kan. 1988). 
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The assignment documents simply cannot carry Petitioners 
argument. As stated above any rights that may have been created 
by the documents were not "erroneously assigned." Furthermore, 
there is no evidence that the documents effectively transferred 
any rights. The documents were not notarized, were not recorded, 
and were not acknowledged by the companies comptroller as company 
assignments or contracts. (T. 125). Neither Mr. Goddard or his 
successor, Mr. Carston, or the independent C.P.A., Mr. Nielsen, 
ever saw the assignments. (T. 49, 100, 126). They were not 
available when the auditors reviewed the company's books and 
records. (T. 142). The record does not indicate whether Harper 
Excavating, Inc. or Harper Contracting, Inc. exercised any rights 
purportedly granted by the gravel sales agreements or the 
assignments of those agreements. 
There are several theories regarding the assignments that 
are a least as plausible as the assumptions made by Petitioners. 
1. Novation. If Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. rather than 
Harper Contracting, Inc. exercised any contractual rights created 
by the gravel sale agreement for an extended period, the parties 
may have changed the contract by their actions creating a 
novation. 
2. Subsequent Assignment of Rights. Just as no one in the 
company had knowledge of the original assignment, perhaps no one 
has knowledge that there was a subsequent assignment of rights. 
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3. Prior Assignment of Rights. The financial statements 
of the companies (Respondent's Exhibit 15-28) state that all 
assets were reallocated at the close of business May 9, 1986. 
The assignments are dated May 10. If the gravel sales contracts 
had been listed as an asset of Harper Excavating, Inc. they would 
have been assigned to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. prior to the 
time they were purportedly assigned to Harper Contracting, Inc. 
4. Breach of Contract. Rulon Harper may have sold sand 
and gravel to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. in breach of any 
rights created in the gravel sale agreement and subsequent 
assignment. 
5. Lack of Consideration. No rights may have been 
created by the gravel sale agreement due to lack of 
consideration. There is no evidence that consideration was given 
for any rights created by the contract. (Nor is there any 
evidence other than the unsupported statement in the document 
that the assignment itself was supported by consideration). 
6. Abandonment. The actions of Harper Contracting, Inc. 
in apparently not exercising its rights under the assignment may 
support an argument that those rights were abandoned. 
7. Mistake. One could argue that the actions of the 
corporation over the audit period, meticulously documented, show 
that the assignment was in error rather then the acts of the 
corporations. 
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There was no "error" made by the comptroller in setting up 
the various corporations following reorganization. He was 
apparently given authorization to distribute the assets of Harper 
Excavating, Inc. to the newly created corporations. (T. 63). He 
took the assets as listed and distributed them. (T. 66). Any 
rights created by the gravel sale contracts and the assignments 
thereof were not listed as assets of the corporation and were not 
assigned. (T. 85). The only time any "error" was suspected is 
when Petitioners were notified following the audit that they had 
created taxable inner-company transactions by the manner in which 
they had restructured their corporation. (T. 101). In 
hindsight, this may have been an error. However, Petitioners, 
having elected their corporate form are saddled with the burdens 
as well as the benefits of limited liability they hoped to 
achieve. Institutional Laundry, 706 P.2d at 1067. 
Taxable transactions occurred over the duration of the audit 
period. Tax was not collected or paid. Petitioners' attempt to 
"restate" or recreate the transactions which occuirred do not make 
them exempt. The commission properly assessed liability. The 
commission's decision should therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Petitioners failed to timely file for judicial 
review, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal and the 
appeal should be dismissed. However, even if this Court finds 
that it has jurisdiction, the Court should affirm the Tax 
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Commission's Final Decision. Petitioners reorganized the 
original company into separate corporations in order to limit 
their potential liability from a pending lawsuit. Petitioners 
seek to disregard the consequences of that choice in an attempt 
to limit sales tax liability. The Court should affirm that once 
a corporation chooses the manner in which to operate, it must 
bear the risks attendant to separate corporate structure. The 
voluminous ledger entries and canceled checks indicate that sales 
of sand and gravel occurred between Harper Excavating, Inc. and 
Harper Contracting, Inc. The Tax Commission properly weighed all 
the evidence and determined that sales had in fact occurred 
between the subsidiaries. Such sales are taxable transactions. 
Institutional Laundry, 706 P.2d 1066. Therefore the order of the 
Tax Commission should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this QjQ* of May, 1993. 
CtARK L. S N E L S O U I 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX 1 
SALES AND USE TAX ACT 59-12-102 
(a) poultry, dairy, and other livestock feed, and their components; 
(b) baling ties and twine used in the baling of hay and straw; 
(c) fuel used for providing temperature control of orchards and 
commercial greenhouses doing a majority of their business in whole-
sale sales, and for providing power for off-highway type farm machin-
ery; and 
(d) feed, seeds, and seedlings. 
(4) (a) "Medicine" means: 
(i) insulin, syringes, and any medicine prescribed for the treat-
ment of human ailments by a person authorized to prescribe 
treatments and dispensed on prescription filled by a registered 
pharmacist, or supplied to patients by a physician, surgeon, or 
podiatrist; 
(ii) any medicine dispensed to patients in a county or other 
licensed hospital if prescribed for that patient and dispensed by a 
registered pharmacist or administered under the direction of a 
physician; and 
(iii) any oxygen or stoma supplies prescribed by a physician or 
administered under the direction of a physician or paramedic, 
(b) "Medicine" does not include: 
(i) any auditory, prosthetic, opthalmic, or ocular device or ap-
pliance; or 
(ii) any alcoholic beverage. 
(5) "Person" includes any individual, firm, partnership, joint venture, 
association, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, 
this state, any county, city, municipality, district, or other local govern-
mental entity of the state, or any group or combination acting as a unit. 
(6) "Purchase price" means the amount paid or charged for tangible 
personal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12-103(1), excluding only cash discounts taken or any excise tax im-
posed on such purchase price by the Federal Government. 
(7) "Residential use" means the use in or around a home, apartment 
building, sleeping quarters, and similar facilities or accommodations. 
(8) (a) "Retail sale" means any sale within the state of tangible per-
sonal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12-103(1), other than resale of such property item, or service by a 
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer. 
(b) "Retail sale" includes sales by any farmer or other agricultural 
producer of poultry, eggs, or dairy products to consumers if such sales 
have an average monthly sales value of $125 or more. 
(9) "Retailer" means a person engaged in a regularly organized retail 
business in tangible personal property or any other taxable item or ser-
vice under Subsection 59-12-103 (1), and selling to the user or consumer 
and not for resale, and includes commission merchants, auctioneers, and 
all persons regularly engaged in the business of selling to users or con-
sumers within the state. "Retailer" does not include farmers, gardeners, 
stockmen, poultrymen, or other growers or agricultural producers produc-
ing and doing business on their own premises, except those who are regu-
larly engaged in the business of buying or selling for a profit. When in the 
opinion of the commission it is necessary for the efficient administration 
of this chapter to regard salesmen, representatives, peddlers, or can-
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vassers as the agents of the dealers, distributors, supervisors, or em-
ployers under whom they operate or from whom they obtain the tangible 
personal property sold by them, irrespective of whether they are making 
sales on their own behalf or on behalf of such dealers, distributors, super-
visors, or employers, the commission may regard them and may regard 
the dealers, distributors, supervisors, or employers as retailers for pur-
poses of this chapter. 
(10) "Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, or barter, conditional 
or otherwise, in any manner, of tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for a consider-
ation. It includes: 
(a) installment and credit sales; 
(b) any closed transaction constituting a sale; 
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, services, or entertainment 
taxable under this chapter; 
(d) any transaction whereby the possession of property is trans-
ferred but the seller retains the title as security for the payment of 
the price; and 
(e) any transaction under which right to possession, operation, or 
use of any article of tangible personal property is granted under a 
lease or contract and such transfer of possession would be taxable if 
an outright sale were made. 
(11) "State" means the state of Utah, its departments, and agencies. 
(12) "Storage" means any keeping or retention of tangible personal 
property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection 
59-12-103(1), in this state for any purpose except sale in the regular 
course of business. 
(13) (a) 'Tangible personal property" means: 
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities; 
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and substances which are 
dealt in or capable of being possessed or exchanged; 
(iii) water in bottles, tanks, or other containers; and 
(iv) all other physically existing articles or things, including 
property severed from real estate, 
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include: 
(i) real estate or any interest therein or improvements 
thereon; 
(ii) bank accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, notes, and other 
evidence of debt; 
(iii) insurance certificates or policies; 
(iv) personal or governmental licenses; 
(v) water in pipes, conduits, ditches, or reservoirs; 
(vi) currency and coinage constituting legal tender of the 
United States or of a foreign nation; and 
(vii) all gold, silver, or platinum ingots, bars, medallions, or 
decorative coins, not constituting legal tender of any nation, with 
a gold, silver, or platinum content of not less than 80%. 
(14) (a) "Use" means the exercise of any right or power over tangible 
personal property under Subsection 59-12-103(1), incident to the 
ownership or the leasing of that property, item, or service. 
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59-12-103. Sales and use tax base — Rate. 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state; 
(b) amount paid to common carriers or telephone or telegraph corpora-
tions as defined by § 54-2-1, whether the corporations are municipally or 
privately owned, for all transportation, telephone service, or telegraph 
service; 
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for commercial cunsumption; 
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for residential use; 
(e) meals sold; 
(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation, 
including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar ac-
commodations; 
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or 
services to install tangible personal property in connection with other 
tangible personal property; 
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible personal property; 
(i) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and ser-
vices for less than 30 consecutive days; 
(j) laundry and dry cleaning services; 
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property situs 
is in this state, if the lessee took possession in this state, or if the property 
is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state. 
(2) Except for Subsection (l)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection 
(1) shall be: 
(a) 5-3/32% through December 31, 1989; and 
(b) 5% from and after January 1, 1990. 
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection (l)(d) shall be: 
(a) 2-3/32% through December 31, 1989; and 
(b) 2% from and after January 1, 1990. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, 9 4; 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, 9 1; 1937, ch. I l l , 9 1; C. 1943, 
80-15-4; L. 1943, ch. 93, 9 1; 1959, ch. 113, 
9 1; 1961, ch. 148, 9 1; 1963, ch. 140, 9 1; 
1965, ch. 126, 9 1; 1965, ch. 127, 9 1; 1969, 
ch. 187, 9 2; 1969 ( l it S.S.), ch. 14, 9 2; 1973, 
ch. 153, 9 1; 1975, ch. 179, 9 1; 1977, ch. 220, 
9 1; 1983, ch. 258, 9 4; 1983, ch. 270, 9 1; 
1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 6, 9 1; 1984, ch. 56, 9 1; 
1985, ch. 172, 9 2; 1986, ch. 37,9 2; 1986 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 4, 9 2; C. 1953, 59-15-4; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, 9 23; 1987, ch. 148, 
9 6; 1987, ch. 221, 9 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment by Chapter 258, inserted provisions for a 
Vi% increase in sales tax from July 1, 1983, 
through June 30, 1987; and added the final 
paragraph. 
The 1983 amendment by Chapter 270 in-
serted the exemption on the sale of currency 
and coinage and on gold, silver, and platinum 
ingots, bars, medallions and coins in Subsec-
tion (a). 
The 1983 (1st S.S.) amendment added V2% to 
the sales tax rates herein for the period begin-
ning October 1, 1983, and ending September 
30, 1984. 
The 1984 amendment added 1/2% to the sales 
tax rates herein beginning October 1, 1984. 
The 1985 amendment substituted "June 30, 
1986, (ii) 4»/64% from July 1, 1986, through 
December 31, 1989, and (iv) 4lh% from Janu-
ary 1, 1990" for "June 30, 1987 and (ii) 4V2% 
from July 1, 1987" in Subsection (a); substi-
tuted "June 30,1986,4M/«% from July 1,1986, 
through December 31, 1989, and 4V2% from 
January 1,1990" for "June 30,1987 and 4V2% 
from July 1,1987" in Subsections (b)(1), (b)(2) 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 53 CJ.S. Licenses § 30. 
Key Numbers. — Licenses *» 15.1(1). 
59-12-107. Collection of tax — Liability for remittance and 
payment of tax — Out-of-state vendors — Re-
turns — Direct payment by purchaser of motor 
vehicle — Credits — Use tax receipts — Deposit 
and sale of security — Excess amount collected — 
Penalties. 
(1) (a) Each vendor is responsible for the collection of the sales or use tax 
imposed under this chapter. 
(b) The vendor is not required to maintain a separate account for the 
tax collected, but is deemed to be a person charged with receipt, safekeep-
ing, and transfer of public moneys. 
(2) Each person storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property 
under Subsection 59-12-103(1), is liable for the use tax imposed under this 
chapter. 
(3) If any sale of tangible personal property or any other taxable item or 
service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), is made by a wholesaler to a retailer, 
upon the representation by the retailer that the personal property is pur-
chased by the retailer for resale, and the personal property thereafter is not 
resold, the wholesaler is not responsible for the collection or payment of the 
tax imposed on the sale, but the retailer is solely liable for the tax. 
(4) If any sale of property or service subject to the tax is made to a person 
prepaying sales or use tax in accordance with Chapter 51, Title 63, the Re-
source Development Act, or to a contractor or subcontractor of that person, the 
person to whom such payment or consideration is payable, upon the represen-
tation by the person prepaying the sales or use tax that the amount prepaid as 
sales or use tax has not been fully credited against sales or use tax due and 
payable under the rules promulgated by the commission, is not responsible for 
the collection or payment of the sales or use tax but the person prepaying the 
sales or use tax is solely liable for such payment, if any. 
(5) (a) Each vendor shall pay or collect and remit the sales and use taxes 
imposed by this chapter if within this state the vendor directly or by any 
agent or other representatives: (i) has or utilizes an office, distribution 
house, sales house, warehouse, service enterprise, or other place of busi-
ness; (ii) maintains a stock of goods; (iii) regularly solicits orders 
whether or not such orders are accepted in this state, unless the activity 
in this state consists solely of advertising or of solicitation by direct mail; 
(iv) regularly engages in the delivery of property in this state other than 
by common carrier or United States mail; or (v) regularly engages in any 
activity in connection with the leasing or servicing of property located 
within this state. 
(b) If none of the conditions listed under Subsection (a) exist, the ven-
dor is not responsible for the collection of the use tax but each person 
storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property is responsible for 
remitting the use tax. 
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(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration 
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-12, enacted by L. present Subsections (l)(b)(i) to (iv); inserted "or 
1987, ch. 161, ( 268; 1988, ch. 72, i 22. within the time period provided by agency 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- rule, whichever is longer" in Subsection (2); 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the and made minor stylistic changes, 
former introductory paragraph in Subsection Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
(1) as present Subsection (l)(a), substituting §
 3 1 5 ma^es the act effective on January 1, 
"30 days" for "ten days" in that paragraph, and 1933. 
redesignated former Subsections (l)(a) to (d) as 
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which 
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is 
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency 
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the request is not 
a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one 
copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue 
a written order granting the request or denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does 
not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the 
request for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-13, enacted by L. stating the specific grounds upon which relief 
1987, ch. 161, § 269; 1988, ch. 72, ft 23. is requested"; deleted "or the order on review" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
 a t the end in Subsection (l)(b); and substituted 
ment, effective April 25 1988 subdivided Sub- Reconsideration" for "rehearing" in Subsection 
section (1) and rewrote Subsection (l)(a), which /o\/u\ 
had read "Within ten days after the date that w " £ .. ^ .
 T , f t o . , , - , 
an order on review is issued, or within ten days . !*! Ye f ~J*WB 1 9 8 V ch* 1 6 1 , 
after the date that a final order is issued for * 31& »akes the act effective on January 1, 
which agency review is unavailable, any party 1988. 
may file a written request for reconsideration 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administra-
tive remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the require-
ment to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
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(i) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(iii) simplify the evidence; 
(iv) facilitate discovery; or 
(v) expedite the proceedings; or 
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the 
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent that 
the requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter. 
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are not 
governed by this chapter, except as explicitly provided in that section. 
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 
63-46b-21 are governed by this chapter. 
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting rules affecting 
or governing adjudicative proceedings or from following any of those rules, if 
the rules are enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the 
requirements of this chapter. 
(7) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any provi-
sion of this chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to an agency 
of the state from the federal government, the applicability of those provisions 
to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary to prevent the 
denial. The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature at 
its next session. 
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent 
basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action. 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding offi-
cer, for good cause shown, from lengthening or shortening any time period 
prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial 
review. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-l, enacted by L. "wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and certifi-
1987, ch. 161, i 257; 1988, ch. 72, ( 15; 1990, cates of registrations, and" for "hunting orfiih-
ch. 306, fi 2; 1991, ch. 207, § 39; 1991, ch. ing licenses, or" in Subsection (n), added the 
212, I 5; 1991, ch. 259, t 51; 1992, ch. 30, Subsection (o) designation, and made related 
{ 128; 1992, ch. 280, ( 57; 1992, ch. 303, ( 12. changes 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend* The 1991 amendment by ch. 259, effective 
ment, effective March 13, 1990, in Subsection April 1, 1992, in Subsection (2)(f), substituted 
(2)(c), inserted 'Ho actions and decisions of the 'Utah" for "the" and inserted "of 1973"; r* 
Psychiatric Security Board relating to dis- wrote Subsection (2)(h), which formerly read 
charge, conditional release, or retention of per- "state agency actions under Article 3, Chapter 
sons under its jurisdiction," deleted "or mental 1, Title 7, and Chapters 2, 8a, and 19, Title 7, 
institution" after "any correctional facility," and Chapter 30, Title 63 or judicial review of 
and inserted "the Utah State Hospital, the those actions;" in Subsection (2)(i), substituted 
Utah State Training School, or persons in the "Chapter 1, Title 35, Worker's Compensation, 
custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Men- and Chapter 2, Title 35, Utah Occupation*] 
tal Health." Disease Disability Law" for "Chapters 1 and 2, 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 207, effective Title 35"; in Subsection (2)(k), substituted TV 
July 1,1991, substituted "Developmental Cen- tie 26, Utah Emergency Medical Services Syi-
ter" for Training School" in Subsection (2)(c) tern Act, Chapter 11, Title 26, Utah Water Pol-
and changed the style of the chapter references lution Control Act, Chapter 12, Title 26, Uttb 
in Subsections (2)(h) and (6). Safe Drinking Water Act, Chapter 13, Title 26, 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 212, effective Air Conservation Act,, or Chapter 14, Title 26, 
April 29,1991, in Subsection (2), made a minor Solid and Hazardous Waste Act" for "Chapter 
stylistic change in Subsection (f), substituted 8, 11, 12, 13 or 14, Title 26"; in Subsection 
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(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dis-
proportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate par-
ties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-14, enacted by L. to have been issued under Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, S 24. 63-46b-13(3)(b)" in Subsection (3); and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- minor stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, divided former Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) and § 315
 makes the act effective on January 1, (2) and redesignated former Subsection (2) as 2988. 
present Subsection (3); added "or is considered 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo 
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of 
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or 
maintains his principal place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial re-
view; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, 
together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the 
agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal 
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceed-
ing; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is 
entitled to obtain judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief 
requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to 
relief, 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
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1
 A Not to my recollection* 
2 Q All right. Then subsequently, did you review to 
3 determine internally what assets were where and how the 
4
 accounts were running and whether--whether payments were 
5 being made back and forth from company to company? 
* A No. 
7 Q Well, how—as the owner of this business and as 
8 the president of this business, what did you do to try to 
9 know whether you're making or losing money and whether 
10 this—this operation is being successful? 
11 A Well., it—the consolidated financial statements is, 
12 all I looked at; as far as the individual companies, if one 
13 needed one or one needed the other, it was all transferred 
14 back and forth. 
15 Q All right. Did you have any concern, for instance] 
16 about whether Sand & Gravel was making or losing money as 
17 opposed to the consolidated result? 
18 A No. 
19 Q And you did sign a lot of checks that went around 
20 from company to company and back and forth, didn't you? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q And how come—why were you signing these checks? 
23 A Sign all the checks. 
24 Q All right. For control, to make sure you know— 
25 A I do—I look at all the bills and sign all the 
22 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
enough 
Q 
this is 
check, 
Page 6 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
to—you're going to have to give me a better copy. 
Okay. This is under Exhibit No. 6 also, I think 
; Page 6. It might be a little bit—it's a different 
however, it's a little better copy. I think it's 
under Exhibit No. 1. 
Okay. 
Who is that issued to? 
To me. 
Does it state anything else besides your name on 
the front of the check? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Pit royalty. 
And who is that from? 
Harper Sand & Gravel. 
Is that your signature on the front? Is that— 
is there a signature on there? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
In what capacity have you signed the check? In 
your—in what capacity have you signed—have you placed 
your, name on the check? As president, vice president of 
what company? 
A 
on the 
Q 
A 
that. 
No, I don't know what you mean. I sign on the— 
checks, what do you—I don't know what you mean. 
You've signed the check on be— 
What capacity? I don't know what you mean by 
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1
 Q You've signed the check on behalf of who? 
2 A Rulon Harper. Me. 
3
 Q But what company? Did you sign the check, for 
* Harper Sand & Gravel? 
5 A Yeah. I sign on all of them, yeah. 
6
 Q But in this check, it says Harper Sand & Gravel; 
7 is that correct? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And is it a fact that at the time you signed 
10 this check as president of Harper Sand & Gravel that you 
11 knew it was for pit royalties? 
12 A Yeah. 
13 MR. CARLTON: At this time, I'd like to introduce 
14 that into the record. 
15 MR. PETERSON: There's no objection. 
16 THE HEARING OFFICER: It's my understanding, 
17 Mr. Peterson and Mr. Carlton, that the plaintiff's—or 
18 respondent's documents which are contained in this binder 
19 are all at some point going to be introduced into evidence 
20 and that you have no objections to them; is that correct? 
21 MR. PETERSON: That is right. 
22 THE HEARING OFFICER: All right. Then that will 
23 be received as well as all of the other documents as you go 
24 along, Mr. Carlton. 
25 MR. CARLTON: Okay. 
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1
 month and you're not—you don't know whether or not you're 
2 receiving $11,000 a month under a promissory note? 
3
 I THE WITNESS: No. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: I think you testified that 
5 | currently all the companies are insured together; is that 
6
 correct? 
7
 THE WITNESS: Yes. And they always have been. 
8 THE HEARING OFFICER: What then was the benefit 
9 to—to restructuring because of an insurance problem when 
10 you did in '86? 
11 THE WITNESS: I don't know. I think you'd be 
12 better to ask Mr. Skeen that. I don't—I— 
13 MR. SKEEN: If you don't mind, let me just 
14 explain. The benefit of restructuring was because you 
15 couldn't get insurance of the magnitude he needed so that 
16 you want a corporation with the rolling stock to be separate 
17 of another corporation, s o — 
18 THE HEARING OFFICER: Is this just to limit his 
19 liabilities so they can't get past— 
20 MR. SKEEN: It's all— 
21 THE HEARING OFFICER: —Sand & Gravel if they went 
22 after Sand & Gravel and— 
23 MR. SKEEN: So they can't get past, that's right, 
24 That's it. And the problem was—was not to buy insurance, 
25 the problem was you couldn't buy it. If you could buy it 
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1
 took place, I just—it was decided to set up four companies, 
2
 a contracting one, a sand and gravel one and a trucking one, 
3
 and those were the logical boundaries, and so whatever 
4
 transactions took place before the reorganization between 
5 Rulon and Harper Excavating I assumed took place between 
6
 Rulon and Harper Sand & Gravel, as far as the gravel was 
7
 concerned, the land. 
8 Q All right. Now, before the reorganization, Harper 
9 Excavating was the only company, so it had—it had the 
10 gravel sales agreements; right? 
11 A I assume so. I never saw any. I — 
12 Q Okay. And so afterwards, it would have been 
13 I necessary, would it not, to—for Harper Excavating to assign 
14 those sand and gravel agreements to one of the other—to 
15 one of the three subsidiaries? 
16 A Yeah, I would—I would do that. 
17 Q Yeah, but did you have the actual assignments 
18 documents when you started devising this system? 
19 A No. There--there really—I mean it all happened 
20 so fast, there wasn't much of anything. You know, we went 
21 to work splitting everything apart entirely, as far as the 
22 procedures, the accounting and setting up checking accounts 
23 and trying to handle just all the paper flow, and you know, 
24 the—Dick Skeen started working on putting together all the 
25 documentation. 
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 Q On the legal side? 
2
 A On the legal side. 
3
 Q Now# it was a fact, wasn't it, that you determined] 
4 from the accounting standpoint, it made sense to assume that] 
5 the sand and gravel company would own whatever there was to 
6 own as far as the—the pits? 
7
 A Yeah, I mean, how -could it sell something it 
8 didn't have. 
9 Q Well , t h a t ' s r i g h t . So you assumed t h a t i t should] 
10 have t hose a s s e t s ' c ause i t was t h e , q u o t e , "The Sand & 
11 Gravel Company"? 
12 A C o r r e c t . 
13 Q All right. And—and basically operating on that 
14 assumption then, you did set up the inter-company accounts 
15 in that fashion? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And you showed sand and gravel going from the 
18 sand and gravel company to excavating, et cetera? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Now, from—if in fact you had known that Sand & 
21 Gravel company didn't own those assets, but in fact they 
22 were owned by the contracting company, would you have set 
23 up the accounts differently, as far as showing ownership 
24 and sales of sand and gravel? 
25 A Yeah. I mean i f — I would have sold them out of 
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 Q So you were in the presence at the time Mr. Harper] 
2 received some of these checks, statements and invoices; is 
3 that correct? 
4
 A Yes. 
5 Q Did he ever say to you that, boy, this is 
6
 incorrect, you shouldn't be allocating this money or these 
7 invoices for these purchases, or anything of that nature? 
8 A No. 
9 Q Did he ever mention your record keeping w^g 
10 incorrect? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Even after he saw some of these checks? 
13 j A No, I just—I told him that I was just— 
14 transferred all to my personal account and don't worry 
15 about it and he just laughed; he knew he was just putting 
16 it from one pocket to another, and so he didn't really— 
17 he didn't really care whether what I did was right or wrong 
18 To him, the money still stayed in his control. 
19 Q Were you ever in the presence when he signed any 
20 of these checks? 
21 A I'm sure I was. I — 
22 Q Did—did—do you know if he ever looked at the 
23 check stubs? 
24 A I think when it came to inter-company transactions] 
25 he pretty much just took my word for whatever was there and 
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1
 figured it was all just kind of a big pain anyway. 
2
 Q Do you know if he ever read the checks, what 
3
 were on the checks? 
4
 A I don't know. 
5
 Q Okay. In your opinion, Mr. Goddard, were the 
6
 checks signed by Rulon Harper as president of Harper 
7
 Contracting for consideration to Harper Excavating for the 
8 sand and gravel that was flowing back and forth between 
9 Harper Sand and Gravel and Harper Excavatingd? 
10 A Well, that was the purpose of all of this was to, 
11 you know, Harper—I mean, under the philosophy that I, 
12 you know, set up, Harper Sand & Gravel owned some sand and 
13 gravel and it needed to go out on a job that was done 
14 through Harper Contracting, then we'd have a —an internal, 
15 or an inter-company sale where Harper Sand & Gravel would 
16 sell that sand and gravel to Harper Contracting, you know, 
17 Harper Sand & Gravel would record it as a receivable, 
18 a-counts receivable from Harper Contracting, Harper 
19 Contracting would record it as an accounts payable, and 
20 then—then we'd write checks, you know, from one corpora— 
21 we'd write a check from Harper Contracting to pay for it. 
22 Q Did any of those checks or check stubs state on 
23 there, sand and gravel purchases? 
24 A I don't know. 
25 Q why don't we turn to Exhibit No. 5? You have the 
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 books? 
2 A Yes. On each company's books. 
3
 Q Would there be paperwork surrounding that sale? 
4
 A As much as possible. 
5 Q And you would be aware of that type of transac-
6
 tion? 
7 A Yes. I would think so. 
8 Q Were there any sales that you knew of in 
9 particular of something of that nature? 
10 A I don't think there were any. I think we pretty 
11 much set all those up, you know, when we split it out so 
12 there wasn't any need to. I mean, one—like Harper 
13 Excavating owned dump trucks, you know, we--you know, I 
14 don't think there was any backhoes put into that corporation] 
15 so there wouldn't have been a need to transfer it that way. 
16 It was all done right at the start. 
17 Q So any of the transfers that you were aware of 
18 were made at the time—Kay 10th, I—May 10th, 1986, and you 
19 were informed of those? 
20 A Well, I was the one that really did it. I just 
21 took a list of everything we had, everything that was 
22 previously an asset and a liability of Harper Excavating 
23 and I divided them up, put this backhoe in this corporation 
24 and this dump truck in another, and put the debt, any debt 
25 associated with that in the proper corporation, to match thej 
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1
 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: Is that—okay. And there 
2
 were all these assets in the company and at the time of 
3
 reorganization, then you, in communication with the 
4
 attorney, you broke them out and put them in the companies 
5 you thought they should go into, I guess? 
6
 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
7 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: Okay. So you—you made the| 
8 accounting the best way you thought it had to be done, 
9
 everything in communication with the other people involved? 
10 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
11 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: Okay. My first question 
12 is, where—where did this all start? Where were the 
13 minerals? Was that in the land account that originally 
14 existed, is that— 
15 THE WITNESS: That was a—allfs I knew at the 
16 time was that the land was ownfed by Rulon Harper, 
17 personally. 
18 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: Okay. And I guess my 
19 question is, does that land in which the minerals are 
20 being extracted from the sand and gravel? 
21 THE WITNESS: That's my understanding, yes. 
22 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: Okay. And that land 
23 account, was it the land account that was on the books? 
24 THE WITNESS: No, because it was not owned by the 
25 corporation. 
80 
1 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: So it was outside and you 
2 would not have had any knowledge about that— 
3 THE WITNESS: No. 
4
 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: — p i t , or I refer to it as 
5 a mineral, meaning the raw material. 
6 THE WITNESS: That's okay. 
7 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: So you did not account for 
8 it then in that sense? 
9 THE WITNESS: No. There was no asset called land 
10 on the books of Harper Excavating prior to the reorganiza-
11 I tion 'cause it wasn't owned by the corporation. 
12 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: Okay. My next question 
13 has—deals with—you stated that the CPA firm prepared 
14 audited financial statements on a consolidated basis for a 
15 period after the—after the reorganization? 
16 THE WITNESS: Yes. I believe we had individual 
17 ones as well. 
18 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: Okay. Just focusing on the 
19 consolidated, was there a—in the—any indication in the 
20 financial statements, a note to the financial statement 
21 that there was a lease or an assignment or a significant 
22 transaction that took place between any of the parties 
23 regarding the extraction? 
24 THE WITNESS: Well, I think there was the—the 
25 traditional related party transaction footnote that, you 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
COMMISSIONER PACHECO: Okay. That's fine 
THE HEARING OFFICER: I had a question, 
Mr. Goddard. Now you stated that prior to reorganization, 
the—to your knowledge, the land from which the sand and 
gravel was extracted belonged to Rulon Harper; is that 
correct? 
THE WITNESS: Yes 
THE HEARING OFFICER: And that wasn't carried 
on the books of Harper Excavating as an asset; is that 
10
 | correct? 
11
 I THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
12
 | THE HEARING OFFICER: And then after the reorgani-| 
13
 | zation, you then included the sand and gravel land as an 
14
 I asset in one of the companies; is that correct? 
15 I THE WITNESS: No 
16
 THE HEARING OFFICER: You didn't? 
17
 THE WITNESS: No. 
18
 I THE HEARING OFFICER: What did you do 
THE WITNESS: I did exactly what was being done 
before the reorganization, after; just—just it went through) 
21
 J Sand & Gravel—Harper Sand & Gravel instead of Harper 
22
 Excavating 
23 THE HEARING OFFICER: So you were assuming then 
24
 I that Sand & Gravel was continuing to pay Mr. Harper 
personally for—for the—for the sand and gravel— 
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THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE HEARING OFFICE"R: —extracted; is that right? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: So it wasn't carried as an 
asset per se, but— 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: —simply as a purchase from 
Mr. Harper and then a sale to Harper Excavating; is that 
correct? 
1 THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's correct. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: Okay, thank you. I have no 
1 further questions. 
• MR. PETERSON: Just—your question, when you 1 
I asked him, you said it continued to be that way; it didn't 
continue because Sand & Gravel wasn't in existence, it was 
new. There was no Sand & Gravel company prior to the 
reorganization. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: I understand that. 
MR. PETERSON: Okay. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: Thank you. 
Thank you, Mr. Goddard. You may step down. 
MR. PETERSON: One question I think you might— 
and I think you might have been misled Commissioner 
Pacheco about. 
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1
 A Yes. Harper Contracting pays Rulon. 
2
 Q And Harper—why does Harper Contracting pay? 
3
 A Because I have now—we've got the gravel sale 
4
 agreements in place as far as who owns the tract of land 
5 within the gravel pits, and Harper Contracting has legal 
6 title to those tracts of land. 
7
 Q And as far as any promissory notes on past due 
8 sales, are those the responsibility of Harper Contracting 
9 or Harper Sand & Gravel? 
10 A That note that was first brought up has now been 
11 rewritten in Harper Contracting. 
12 Q I'm going to pass to you Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 
13 through 10 which are gravel sales agreement and assignments 
14 of gravel sales agreements, and ask you if you are familiar 
15 with these documents. Why don't I just break them all apart 
16 THE HEARING OFFICER: Are those the documents 
17 that are attached to your brief, Mr. Peterson? 
18 MR. PETERSON: Probably. I'm trying to remember, 
19 I think they are among the documents that are attached. 
20 I've written too many briefs lately, I can't remember. 
21 I'll gust distribute these, one copy for both of you. 
22 Those are the same, are they not? 
23 THE HEARING OFFICER: I think so. 
24 MR. PETERSON: Okay. 
25 There are--I think I did not have, for some 
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1
 A Well, we were operating as one—as one company 
2 and it was treated as such. 
3 Q And so it was all a wash-out in the inter-company 
4
 accounts? 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q And as far as sales taxes on a consolidated basis, 
7 did it make any difference? 
8 A No, 
9 Q Now, from—on an ongoing basis then, on a current 
10 account basis, are there any sales for inter-company 
11 obligations reflected on the ledgers currently for sales 
12 of sand and gravel from the sand and gravel company to 
13 Excavating or to Contracting? 
14 A There is an inter-company transaction between 
15 Contracting and Sand & Gravel now, because Sand & Gravel 
16 still operates the gravel pit operations and they will 
17 sell sand and gravel to outside vendors, and there is a 
18 transaction that is created for the sale between Contracting 
19 and Sand & Gravel, an exempt sale, and then Harper Sand & 
20 Gravel then sells it to an outside vendor and collects 
21 sales tax and we remit the sales tax on our sales tax 
22 return. 
23 Q But Harper Contracting no longer purchases sand 
24 and gravel? 
25 A No. 
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1
 A Yes. 
2 Q Okay. 
3
 MR. PETERSON: I have no further questions. 
4
 THE HEARING OFFICER: Mr. Carlton? 
5
 MR. CARLTON: Yeah, I have a couple questions. 
6
 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
7
 BY MR. CARLTON: 
8 Q Is it standard procedure for an auditor to go 
9 through and look at all the contracts and assignments? 
10 A Yeah, anything that's material to the financial 
11 statements. 
12 Q And your testimony I guess is then that those 
13 were not present at the time that you were looking at the 
14 books? 
15 A D i d n ' t — d i d not o b t a i n them. 
16 Q Did you ask for them? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Wh o did you ask for those documents? 
19 A The comptroller. 
20 Q And his name is? 
21 A Steve Goddard. 
22 Q And Mr. Goddard represented that what he gave you 
23 was the totality of all the documents; is that correct? 
24 A Yeah. 
25 Q Can you remember when that took place? 
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1
 A When what took place? 
2 Q When you met--you met with them yearly; was there 
3 a certain period of time that that would have occurred 
4
 each year, or is i t — 
5 A Yeah, it would—for this financial statement, it 
6
 would have occurred approximately—we would have probably 
7
 met right near the end of February of '87, and then through-
8 out the period of the audit, which would have extended from 
9 probably the first part of March until the report date. 
10 Q So annually you would meet with Mr, Goddard and 
11 go over the contracts and assignments that—that Harper 
12 Investment, Harper Sand & Gravel and the other companies 
13 entered into; is that correct? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And each year he represented that these are the 
16 totality of all the assignments and contracts that I have 
17 in m y — 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And for each of those years, you never saw the 
20 assignments that you're basing your amended financial 
21 statements on? 
22 A Right. 
23 Q Were you privileged to see the agreements—I'm 
24 not talking about the assignments, I'm talking about the 
25 agreements? 
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A The agreements where the companies split up? 
Q No. The agreements--the agreement between the 
3
 Harpers and Harper Excavating to sell this sand and 
4
 gravel? 
5
 A Did not see those-
6
 Q Did you have any meetings about these types of 
7
 financial statements with Mr, Harper at any time? 
8
 A At the end of the audit, we always meet and go 
9
 over the financial statements. Mainly, we talk about the 
10 consolidated re—financial statement. 
11 Q Can you remember if you went over the financial 
12 statement you have in front of you with Mr. Harper? 
13 A I cannot. He's interested in the consolidated, 
1* and I know we go over that; as far as if we go over each 
15 of the individual, or if we did at this point in time, I 
16 cannot say 
17 Q Did you present Mr. Harper with all these financial 
18 statements? 
19 A I'm not sure if we gave them directly to him 
20 Q Do you know if he made any comments about your 
21 financial statement, your report? 
22 I A 
23 
24 
25 
I can't—I can't recall 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
CARLTON: I have 
HEARING OFFICER: 
PETERSON: No. 
no 
any. 
further ques 
Any redirect, 
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>tions. 
Mr. Peterson? 
1 THE HEARING OFFICER: Commissioner Pacheco, any 
2 questions? 
3 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: One question. The Harper 
4 Contracting Company was selling sand and gravel, okay? 
5 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
6 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: There is not—I just 
7 looked through the financial statements, there's not a 
8 land account in the financial statements, nor could I find 
9 land in any of the other two subsidiaries. Now, where 
10 would the—where would you think that the land—or the sale 
11 of sand and gravel would come from if there's no land 
12 account in any of the companies? 
13 THE WITNESS: Okay. The land is owned by Rulon 
14 Harper personally. 
15 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: That's what you now know. 
16 THE WITNESS: And it was at that time also, and wej 
17 knew that. 
18 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: All right. So it wasn't 
19 a question of who owned the land at inception, it was only 
20 the assignment you were not aware of? 
21 THE WITNESS: Right. 
22 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: Okay. 
23 THE WITNESS: Right. 
24 COMMISSIONER PACHECO: That's all the questions I 
25 have. 
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* ended February 29th, 1988. *Go to Page 4, you'll again see 
2 the income as reported on the financial statement for 
3
 Harper Con—for Harper Excavating and you'll see that 
4
 amount is $6,262,769, which is the same figure that's 
5 reported on the income tax return. 
6
 And then if you go to Page 8 of Exhibit 22, you 
7
 see a statement at the bottom* of that Statement No. 6, 
8 related party transactions where it says the company— 
9 speaking of Harper Excavating—has entered into an agreement] 
10 with a wholly-owned subsidiary of its parent company to 
11 sell sand and gravel and provide the hauling of material 
12 to job sites. Sand and gravel sales and material hauling 
13 income of $4,436,237 are included in the financial statement] 
14 as part of the contracting income for the year ended 
15 February 29, 1988. 
16 So of that $6 million figure that's on the 
17 financial statement and the income tax return for Harper 
18 Excavating, $4,436,237 of that represents the sale from 
19 Harper Excavating to Harper Contracting. 
20 And then just one last overlay. I'd just like 
21 to document with this overlay as noted in the left-hand 
22 corner the royalty, pit royalty payments from Harper Sand 
23 & Gravel to the owners of the pits, and that refers to 
24 Exhibit No. 1. You see the first check there is made out, 
25 i can't see the amount, to Rulon Harper, for pit royalties 
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1 Q I—I remember those checks. 
2 A —pit royalties. 
3 Q That's right, and I understand the conclusion you 
4 drew from those checks; but I'm just—if we confine 
5 ourselves now to these income statements, I don't think 
Q that we'll find any sand and gravel listed as an asset. 
7 Now, can it—in terms of sales taxes, can a 
8 company, wholly apart from sales taxes, can a company sell 
g something to someone if it doesn't own it? 
A I guess if it doesn't belong to them, no, they 
couldn't do that. 
Q All right. And when you—when you conducted this 
audit, or when your staff did and you reviewed it, you were, 
in a sense, dependent upon the—the records and the 
information and other things provided to you by the company; 
were you not? 
A Yes. That's correct. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 Q All r i g h t . And are you famil iar with—I don ' t 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
want to overstate it; but are you familiar with computers 
at all? Do you know the GIGO principle? 
A I don't believe I do, no. 
Q GIGO principle is garbage in garbage out, and I 
don't want to—I'm not trying to be perjorative, but that's 
just another way of stating that if you've got that 
25 information, you're going to get that results; isn't that 
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1 true? 
2
 A I guess that would be true. 
3
 I Q And it is the unfortunate case, is it not, that 
when you were doing your audit, when your staff was out 
5 there, the company didn't—didn't give you, Mr. Goddard 
6 didn't give you, Mr. Carston, they just didn't have, in the 
7 stuff you looked at, those—those sales contracts and the 
8 assignments weren't there for you, were they? 
9 A That is correct. 
10 Q And so you were—in a sense, you're handicapped, 
11 you're not—you're not given everything you need? 
12 A Obviously we were not. 
13 Q N o w — 
14 MR. PETERSON: I don't—I don't have any further 
15 questions. Thank you. 
16 THE HEARING OFFICER: Redirect, Mr. Carlton? 
17 MR. CARLTON: No redirect. 
18 THE HEARING OFFICER: I have a question, 
19 Mr. Ashcroft. Does the fact that you now know of those 
20 assignments and sales contracts change your determination 
21 of whether or not a taxable transaction occurred between 
22 two entities in question? 
23 THE WITNESS: I don't think it does, as I've 
24 just demonstrated through the overlays, you can see that 
25 there are transactions occurring between those different 
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REPORT OF CERTIFIED PUBLH ACCOUNTANTS 
Board ol Ducetors and lit ut k! n I dlt i 
Harper Sand and Gravel, Inr 
Ue ha it examined the statement of financial position of Harper Sand and 
Gravel, Inc., as of February 28, 1987 and the related statements of income and 
retained earnings, and changes in financial position for the period from May 
10, 1986 (inception) through February 28, 1987. Our examination was made in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, 
included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing 
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. 
In our npinion, the financial statements referred to above present ianly 
the financial position of Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc., as ol February 28, 1987 
and the results of its operations and changes in its financial position for the 
period from May 10, 1986 (inception) through February ?B, 1Q87 in nnformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles, 
Our examination was made primarily for Lin puipose of forming an opinion 
on the basic financial statements taken as a whole. The accompanying 
supplementary financial information is not considered necessary lor a tan 
presentation of the basic financial statements and is presented for analytical 
purposes only. The supplementary information was derived from the accounting 
records tested by us as part of our examination of the aforementioned financial 
statements and, in our opinion, is fairly stated in all material respects in 
relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole. 
May 8, 1QR7 
HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL. INC. 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION 
February 28, 1987 
ASSETS 
Current Assets: 
Cash $ *,124 
Accounts receivable (net of allowance 
for doubtful accounts of $2,000) 76,096 
Receivables from related ent i t ies 503,257 
Total current assets 583,477 
Equipment: 
Construction equipment 004,430 
Crushing equipment 397T390 
1,061,846 
Less: Accumulated depreciation 803,465 
Net equipment 258,381 
Total Assets $ 841,858 
Continued on next page -
(continued) STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION 
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS1 EQUITY 
fnrrpnt Liabilities: 
Accounts payable $ A,!?1! 
Accrued expenses 4,939 
Income taxes payable 2,825 
Payables to related entities 120,450 
Current portion of long-term dc'lln 165,994 
Total LUireuL liabilities 298,333 
Long-term debt, excluding cuirent portion 191,001 
Commi tment — 
Total liabilities 489,334 
Stockholders1 Equity: 
Common stock; no par, stated value $100, 
authorized 50,000 shares, issued and 
outstanding 1,000 shares 100,000 
Additional paid-in capital 211,030 
Retained earnings 41,494 
Total stockholders1 equity 352,524 
Total Liabilities and Stockholders1 Equity $841,858 
The accompanying notes are an integral 
part of the financial statements. 
HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL, INC, 
STATEMENTS OF INCOME AND RETAINED EARNINGS 
For the Period From May 10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987 
INCOME: 
Contracting income $1,753,217 
Direct costs 1,481,668 
Gross profit 271,549 
EXPENSES: 
General and administrative 242,130 
Interest 25,885 
268,015 
Retained earnings, beginning of period 
Add: Net income 
Retained earnings, end of period 
Net operating income 3,534 
OTHER INCOME: 
Interest income 26,189 
Other income 446 
Income before provision for income taxes 
Income tax benefit 
Net Income $ 
$ 
$ 
30,169 
11,325 
41,494 
-0-
41,494 
41,494 
The accompanying notes are an integral 
part of the financial statements. 
HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL, INC. 
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION 
For the Period From May lu, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987 
. -- Provided: 
From operations: 
Net income $ 41,494 
Items which do not use (piuvide) 
working capital: 
Depreciation 119,844 
Deferred taxes (14,150) 
Working capital prr •l- i' • n.1 H-,188 
From other sources: 
Long-term debt borrowings 335,190 
Issuance of common stock 311,030 
Total n.:^ provided 793,408 
Funds Appl; _ „_ 
Acquisition of equipment 120,468 
Current maturities and repayment of 
long-term debt 
• Long-term, assets less long-term liabilities 
spun off from Harper Excavating, Tnr 194,378 
Total funds applied 508,264 
iii J ease in working Capital $285,144 
Changes in Components of Working Capital: 
Increase (decrease^ in current assets: 
C a s h "|i 
Accounts receiva: *b,uVw 
Receivable fr-*- * ed entities 503,257 
583,477 
• (Increase) decrease in curreiit " " V !'.' *.e : 
Accounts payable -^ (4,125) 
Accrued expenses (4,939) 
Income taxes payable (2,825) 
Payables to related entities (120,450) 
Current portion of long-term debt (165,994) 
(298,333) 
Increase in Working Capital $285,144 
iiie accompanying notes are an in tegra l 
part of the financial s tatements. 
HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL, INC. 
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
1. Summary of S igni f icant Accounting P o l i c i e s 
a. Business Information 
On May 10, 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. performed a tax free 
reorganization pursuant to section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
As a result of this reorganization, three new corporations were 
formed. 
At the close of business on May 9, 1986 Harper Excavating, Inc. 
transferred at book value all fixed assets and liabilities relating 
to the sand and gravel operations to Harper Sand & Gravel, Inc., in 
exchange for 1,000 shares of Harper Sand & Gravel, Inc. no par common 
stock. Harper Excavating, Inc. then changed its corporate name to 
Harper Investments, Inc. and Harper Investments, Inc. changed its 
corporate name to Harper Excavating, Inc. The Company was organized 
to carry on sand and gravel operations. 
b. Equipment and Depreciation 
Equipment is stated at cost. Depreciation is provided on the 
straight-line method over a 3 to 8 year period. Major replacements 
which extend the useful lives of equipment are capitalized and 
depreciated over the remaining useful life. Normal maintenance and 
repair items are charged to costs and expenses as incurred. 
The Company uses accelerated methods of depreciation for income tax 
purposes. These methods provide more depreciation expense in the 
early years than in the later years of the life of the asset. 
Upon the retirement or disposal of equipment, the costs and related 
. accumulated depreciation amounts are eliminated and any gain or loss 
is included in operations in the year of disposition, 
c. Income Taxes 
Income tax expense is provided based on earnings reported for 
financial statement purposes. Certain items of income and expense 
are recognized in different periods for tax and financial accounting 
purposes. The timing difference is created by other accounting 
methods used for depreciation for tax reporting purposes, the effects 
of such difference is reported as deferred income taxes. 
Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. 
Notes to Financial Statements • • contii lueri 
Receivables/Payables with Related Entities 
Receivables from Uif« Parent Company at February 28, 198/, represents 
receivables for cash deposits made into the Parent Company cash accounts. 
Receivables from a wholly-owned subsidiary ui L lie I'uiunL Lumpany 
represents receivables due from sand and gravel sold to the company, 
Payables lo i.he Parent Company reprc^^au an.oi*,..w -.-^  ^ ] management fees 
charged and other miscellaneous expenses paid for bv the Parent Company, 
Payables Mi olht«i wholly-ow.^« i^u..^ , ,«**
 Ac . L U G r a i e m o o m p a n y 
represents rental charged for the use of tru^^^, fuel and repairs and 
maintenance of equipment, 
Following is a schedule of the receivables/payable-
Parent Company $469,029 $ 
Other wholly-owned subsidiaries 
of the Parent Company 33,628 48,384 
$503,257 $120,450 
The amounts receivable/payable are non i nterest bearing and are expected 
to be collected/paid in 1987 
Income Taxes 
Provision for income taxes is made based, on earnings reported m Hie 
financial statements for the amount of income taxes payable currently and 
in the future (deferred income taxes)* Deferred taxes arise from 
computing depreciation using accelerated methods for tax purposes. 
.Deferred taxes attributable to the amounts attributable to accelerated 
depreciation are shown as long-term. 
The (provision) benefit; for income taxes consists of the following: 
Current income taxes: 
Federal provision - $ tl,100) 
State provision " (725) 
Current income tax expense (.',825) 
Deferred i.' ' if t !»>, I JO 
(Provision) benefit for 
income taxes $ 11,325 
Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. 
Notes to Financial Statements - continued 
4. Long-Term Debt 
Long-term debt obligations at February 28, 1987 consist of the following: 
10.25% and 12.75% notes payable, due 
in monthly installments of $8,596 and 
$3,036 including interest. Notes are 
due March 1988 and December 1989, 
secured by equipment. $273,577 
Prime + 1% note payable due in monthly 
installments of $2,381 including 
interest due May 1988, secured by 
equipment. 30,917 
Prime + .9% note payable, due in monthly 
installments of $1,944 plus interest 
due July 1989, secured by equipment. 52,501 
Total long-term debt 356,995 
Less current portion of long-term debt 165,994 
Total long-term debt excluding 
current portion $ 191,001 
Aggregate maturities of long-term debt in each of the next five years are 
as follows: 1988 - $165,994, 1989 - $119,274, 1990 - $ 71,727, 1991 - $ 
— , 1992 - $ — . 
Equipment pledged as collateral for the 
above existing debt obligations: 
Construction equipment $982,893 
Less: Accumulated depreciation 678,255 
Book value of pledged equipment $304,638 
Of the above book value of pledged equipment, $154,788 is also pledged as 
collateral for debt obligations of related Companies. 
5. Related Party Transactions 
The Company sells sand and gravel to a wholly-owned subsidiary of its 
Parent Company. Sand and gravel sales of $1,049,979 are included in the 
financial statements as part of contracting income for the period ended 
February 28, 1987. The Company shows a receivable from this company in 
the amount of $30,056 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related to sand and 
gravel sales. 
H a rp e r Sand and Gravel, Inc. 
Notes to Financial Statements - continued 
The Corrcaii; ..±. its equipment maintained and repaired by a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of its Parent Company. Maintenance and repairs of $380,528 are 
included in the financial statements as part: of di recti costs for the 
period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this 
company in the amount of $44,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related 
to these maintenance and repairs. 
The Company also uses tu ticks owned bj a who'll y-owned subsidiary of its 
Parent Compai :i] R> = •  ite .3 expense for these trucks amounted to $1,065 and 
are included in the financial statements as part of direct costs for the 
period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this 
company in the amount of $1,065 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related 
to truck rentals. 
The Company has also entered into an agreement with its Parent Company, 
'whereby it pays a monthly management fee :' *r re . rd keeping and management 
services provided by the Parent Company. Management fees, pursuant to 
this agreement, of $179,750 are included in the financial statements for 
the period ended February 28, 1987 The Company shows a payable to its 
.Parent Company in the amount of $32,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) 
related to management fees, 
6. Employee Benefit Plans 
The Corrpany has a contributory profit sharing and retirement plai- ;o. . * 
benefit of all employees who have completed one year of service (1.000 
hours) and attained the age of 25. The plan provides for normal 
retirement on the anniversary of the plan nearest the 65th birthday and 
participants become fully vested after 10 years of sei vice.. The Company 
may make contributions to the plan out of its net or cumulative earnings • 
At February 28, 1987 the Company accrued no contributions to the plan. 
1. C 
The Company entered into an agreement on June 12, 1986 with its Parent 
Company to pay $700,000, due in annual installments of $70,000 together 
with accrued interest on February 25 until paid. The interest rate is 
based on the applicable federal rate for ten year loans that is in effect 
in the month of January in the year preceding the year each payment i s 
due. Cash payments on the commitm*"* ^' made in the form ::)f 
dividends 
The Parent Company has a secured interest in. all personal *v^«~-*« 
accounts receivable and equipment of the Company. 
HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL, INC. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
HARPEk bAtiD MD GRAVEL, INC. 
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES 
For the Period From May ' noc /Tr\ception) through February 28, T9P7 
Advertising 
Bad debts 2,038 
Bank charges 93 
Insurance 44,301 
Management fees 179,750 
Office supplies 3,201 
Repairs and .maintenance 4,260 
Taxes, licenses and permits 1,232 
Telephone and utilities 6,293 
Miscellaneous 803 
G&NEHAI, , .ITf1"" , \\f\l M ::IKA1I VK EXPANSES $242,130 
RESPONDENT'S EXHTRTT IR 
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REPORT OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
Board of Directors and Stockholders 
Harper Excavating, Inc. 
We have examined the statement of financial position of Harper Excavating, 
Inc., as of February 28, 1987 and the related statements of (loss) and retained 
earnings (deficit), and changes in financial position for the period from May 
10, 1986 (inception) through February 28, 1987. Our examination was made in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, 
included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing 
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly 
the financial position of Harper Excavating, Inc., as of February 28, 1987 and 
the results of its operations and changes in its financial position for the 
period from May 10, 1986 (inception) through February 28, 1987, in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles. 
Our examination was made primarily for the purpose of forming an opinion 
on the basic financial statements taken as a whole. The accompanying 
supplementary financial information is not considered necessary for a fair 
presentation of the basic financial statements and is presented for analytical 
purposes only. The supplementary information was derived from the accounting 
records tested by us as part of our examination of the aforementioned financial 
statements and, in our opinion, is fairly stated in all material respects in 
relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole. 
S fftona+r,, C&€~t> /A?**, 
May 8, 1987 
HARPER EXCAVATING, INC. 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION 
February 28, 1987 
ASSETS 
Current Assets: 
Cash $ 127,953 
Accounts receivable 1,800 
Receivables from related entities 348,705 
Total current assets 478,458 
Building and Equipment: 
Building 54,311 
Shop equipment 30,259 
Construction -equipment 2,181,141 
2,265,711 
Less: Accumulated depreciation 1,802,078 
Net building and equipment 463,633 
Total Assets $ 942,091 
Continued on next page -
(continued) STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION 
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS1 EQUITY 
Current Liabilities: 
Accounts payable 308,039 
Accrued expenses 25,035 
Payables to related entities 112,904 
Current portion of long-term debt 72,031 
Total current liabilities 518,009 
Long-term debt, excluding current portion 41,473 
Commitment — 
Total liabilities 559,482 
Stockholders1 Equity: 
Common stock; no par, stated value $100, 
authorized 50,000 shares, issued and 
outstanding 1,000 shares 100,000 
Additional paid-in capital 357,319 
Retained earnings (deficit) (74,710) 
Total stockholders1 equity 382,609 
Total Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity $942,091 
The accompanying notes are an integral 
part of the financial statements. 
HARPER EXCAVATING, INC. 
STATEMENTS OF (LOSS) AND RETAINED EARNINGS (DEFICIT) 
For the Period from May 10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987 
INCOME: 
Contracting income $4,732,603 
Direct costs 4,328,807 
Gross profit 403,796 
EXPENSES: 
General and administrative 534,502 
Interest 16,047 
550,549 
Net operating (loss) (146,753) 
OTHER INCOME: 
Interest income 1,006 
Rental income 15,682 
Other income 10»705 
(Loss) before provision for income taxes (119,360) 
Income tax benefit 44,650 
Net (Loss) $ (74,710) 
Retained earnings, beginning of period $ -0~ 
Add: Net (loss) (74,710) 
Retained earnings (deficit), end of period $ (74,710) 
Tfte accompanying notes are an integral 
part of the financial statements. 
HARPER EXCAVATING, INC, 
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN' FINANCIAL POSITION 
For the Period from May'10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987 
Funds Provided: 
From operations: 
Net (loss) $(74,710) 
Items which do not use (provide) 
working capital: 
Depreciation 218,671 
Deferred taxes (44,650) 
Working capital provided by operations 99,311 
From other sources: 
Long-term debt borrowings 47,110 
Issuance of common stock 457,319 
Total funds provided 603,740 
Funds Applied: 
Acquisition of equipment 59,865 
Current maturities and repayment of 
long-term debt 135,876 
Long-term assets less long-term liabilities 
spun off from Harper Excavating, Inc. 447,550 
Total funds applied 643,291 
(Decrease) in Working Capital $(39,551) 
Changes in Components of Working Capital: 
Increase (decrease) in current assets: 
Cash $127,953 
Accounts receivable 1,800 
Receivables from related entities 348,705 
478,458 
(Increase) decrease in current liabilities: 
Accounts payable (308,039) 
Accrued expenses (25,035) 
Payables to related entities (112,904) 
Current portion of long-term debt (72,031) 
(518,009) 
(Decrease) in Working Capital $(39,551) 
The accompanying notes are an integral 
part of the financial statements. 
HARPER EXCAVATING, INC. 
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
1. Summary of Significant Accounting Policies 
a #
 Business Information 
On May 10, 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. performed a tax free 
reorganization pursuant to section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
As a part of this reorganization, three new corporations were formed. 
At the close of business on May 9, 1986 Harper Excavating, Inc. 
transferred at book value all fixed assets and liabilities relating 
to the trucking operations to Harper Investments, Inc., in exchange 
for no par common stock. Harper Excavating, Inc. then changed its 
corporate name to Harper Investments, Inc. and Harper Investments, 
Inc. changed its corporate name to Harper Excavating, Inc. 
The Company was organized to carry on trucking operations and perform 
repairs and maintenance for other wholly-owned subsidiaries of its 
Parent Company. 
b. Building, Equipment and Depreciation 
Building and equipment are stated at cost. Depreciation is provided 
on the straight-line method on the estimated lives of the various 
classes of assets. Building is depreciated over 15 years and 
equipment over a 3 to 8 year period. Major replacements which extend 
the useful lives of equipment are capitalized and depreciated over 
the remaining useful life. Normal maintenance and repair items are 
charged to costs and expenses as incurred. 
The Company uses accelerated methods of depreciation for income tax 
purposes. These methods provide more depreciation expense in the 
early years than in the later years of the life of the asset. 
Upon the retirement "or disposal of equipment, the costs and related 
accumulated depreciation amounts are eliminated and any gain or loss 
is included in operations in the year of disposition. 
c. Income Taxes 
Income tax expense i s provided based on earnings reported for 
financial statement purposes. Certain items of income and expense 
are recognized in different periods for tax and financial accounting 
purposes. The timing difference i s created by other accounting 
methods used for depreciation for tax reporting purposes, the effects 
of such difference i s reported as deferred income taxes. 
Harper Excavating. Inc. 
Notes to Financial Statements - continued 
2. Receivables/Pavables with Related Entities 
Receivables from the Parent Company at February 28, 1987, represents 
receivables for cash deposits made into the Parent Company cash accounts 
and rental charged for the use of the Company's trucks. 
Receivables from other wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Parent Company 
represents sale of sand and gravel, hauling of material, sale of fuel and 
repairs and maintenance of equipment. 
Payables to the Parent Company represents amounts due for management fees 
charged and other miscellaneous expenses paid for by the Parent Company. 
Payables to other wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Parent Company 
represents sand and gravel purchases by the company. 
Following is a schedule of receivables/payables with related entities: 
Receivables Payables 
Parent Company $ 48,010 $ 82,848 
Other wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of the 
Parent Company 300,695 30,056 
$348,705 $112,904 
The amounts receivable/payable are non-interest bearing and are expected 
to be collected/paid in 1987. 
3, Income Taxes 
Provision for income taxes is made based on earnings reported in the 
financial statements for the amount of income taxes payable currently and 
r. in the future (deferred income taxes). Deferred taxes arise from 
computing depreciation using accelerated methods for tax purposes. 
Deferred taxes attributable to the amounts attributable to accelerated 
depreciation are shown as long-term. 
The (provision) benefit for income taxes consists of the following: 
Current income taxes: 
Federal provision $ — 
State provision — 
Current income tax expense 
Deferred tax benefit 44,650 
(Provision) benefit for 
income taxes $ 44,650 
Harper Excavating, Inc. 
Notes to Financial Statements - continued 
The current year loss of the Company will be made available as an offset 
against other taxable income by filing a consolidated tax return with its 
Parent Company and other wholly-owned subsidiaries for the current year. 
4. Long-Term Debt 
Long-term debt obligations at February 28, 1987 consist of the following: 
9.5% and 10.25% notes payable, due in 
monthly installments of $605 and $865 
including interest due November 1990 
and March 1987 respectively, secured 
by equipment. $ 44,800 
Prime + 1% note payable, due in monthly 
installments of $5,291 including interest 
due May 1988, secured by equipment. 68,704 
Total long-term debt 113,504 
Less current portion of long-term debt 72,031 
Total long-term debt excluding 
current portion $ 41,473 
Aggregate maturities of long-term debt in each of the next five years are 
as follows: 1988 - $72,031, 1989 - $25,628, 1990 - $9,179, 1991 - $6,666, 
1992 - $ — . 
Equipment pledged as collateral for the 
above existing debt obligations: 
Construction equipment $268,995 
Less: Accumulated depreciation 110,774 
Book value of pledged equipment $158,221 
5. Related Pa^y Transactions 
The Company has entered into an agreement with a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of its Parent Company to sell sand and gravel and provide the hauling of 
material to job sites. Sand and gravel sales and material hauling income 
of M A^O Q32 are included in the financial statements as part of 
c o n t ^ for t h e P e r i o d e n d e d ^bruary 28, 1987. The Company 
shows a receivable from this company in the amount of $143,474 as of 
February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related to this income. 
Harper Excavating, Inc. 
Notes to Financial Statements - continued 
The Company maintains and repairs equipment for wholly-owned subsidiaries 
of its Parent Company. ' Maintenance and repairs of $1,149,435 are included 
in the financial statements as part of contracting income for the period 
ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a receivable from these 
companies in the amount of $137,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) 
related to these maintenance and repairs. 
The Company also rents trucks owned by it to these companies. Rental 
income for these trucks amounted to $15,682 and are included in the 
financial statements as rental income for the period ended February 28, 
1987. The Company shows a receivable from these companies in the amount 
of $15,682 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related to these truck 
rentals* 
The Company has also entered into an agreement with its Parent Company, 
whereby it pays a monthly management fee for record keeping and management 
services provided by the Parent Company. Management fees, pursuant to 
this agreement, of $318,250 are included in the financial statements for 
the period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to its 
Parent Company in the amount of $36,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) 
related to management fees. 
The Company also purchases sand and gravel from a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of its Parent Company. Sand and gravel purchases of $1,049,979 are 
included in the financial statements as part of direct costs for the 
period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this 
company in the amount of $30,056 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related 
to sand and gravel purchases. 
6. Employee Benefit Plans 
The Company has a contributory profit sharing and retirement plan for the 
benefit of all employees who have completed one year of service (1,000 
hours) and attained the age of 25. The plan provides for normal 
retirement on the anniversary of the plan nearest the 65th birthday and 
participants become fully vested after 10 years of services. The Company 
may make contributions to the plan out of its net or cumulative earnings. 
At February 28, 1987 the Company accrued no contributions to the plan. 
7. Commitment 
The Company entered into an agreement on June 12, 1986 with its Parent 
Company to pay $1,000,000 due in annual installments of $100,000 together 
with accrued interest on February 25 until paid. The interest rate is 
based on the applicable federal rate for ten year loans that is in effect 
in the month of January in the year preceding the year each payment is 
due. Cash payments on the commitment will be made in the form of 
dividends. 
The Parent Company has a secured interest in all personal property, 
accounts receivable and equipment of the Company. 
HARPER EXCAVATING, INC. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
HARPER EXCAVATING, INC. 
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES 
For the Period From May 10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987 
Advertising $ 257 
Bank charges 2,815 
Insurance - general 131,430 
Insurance - health 10,576 
Management fees 318,250 
Office supplies 1,061 
Property taxes 10,946 
Taxes, licenses and permits 43,344 
Miscellaneous 15,823 
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES $534,502 
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 19 
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REPORT OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
Board of Directors and Stockholders 
Harper Contracting, Inc. 
We have examined the statement of financial position of Harper 
Contracting, Inc.,. as of February 28, 1987 and the related statements of (loss) 
and retained earnings (deficit), and changes in financial position for the 
period from May 10, 1986 (inception) through February 28, 1987. Our 
examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards 
and, accordingly, included such tests of the accounting records and such other 
auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly 
the financial position of Harper Contracting, Inc., as of February 28, 1987 and 
the results of its operations and changes in its financial position for the 
period from May 10, 1986 (inception) through February 28, 1987, in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles. 
Our examination was made primarily for the purpose of forming an opinion 
on the basic financial statements taken as a whole. The accompanying 
supplementary financial information in the accompanying schedules 1 & 2 is not. 
considered necessary for a fair presentation of the basic financial statements 
and is presented for analytical purposes only. The supplementary information 
was derived from the accounting records tested by us as part of our examination 
of the aforementioned financial statements and, in our opinion, is fairly 
stated in all material respects in relation to the basic financial statements 
taken as a whole. 
May 8, 1987 
A Professional Corporation 
Other Office: 
Denver. Colorado 
HARPER CONTRACTING, INC, 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION 
February 28, 1987 
ASSETS 
Current Assets: 
Cash $ 38,683 
Accounts receivable (net of allowance 
for doubtful accounts of $100,000) 999,737 
Costs and estimated earnings in excess 
of billings on uncompleted contracts 130,616 
Receivables from related entities 125,818 
Total current assets 1,314,854 
Building and Equipment: 
Building 10,062 
Construction equipment 3,049,702 
3,059,764 
Less: Accumulated depreciation 2,147,757 
Net building and equipment 912,007 
Total Assets $2,226,861 
Continued on next page -
(continued) STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION 
LIABILITIES AMD STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY 
Current Liabilities: 
Accounts payable 
Accrued expenses 
$ 118,419 
Billings in excess of costs and 16,370 
estimated earnings on uncompleted 
contracts 
Payables to related entities 138,311 
Deferred income taxes - current 342,678 
Current portion of long-term debt 220,300 
347.036 
1,183.114 
Total current l i a b i l i t i e s 
Note payable-related entity 
Long-term debt, excluding current portion J2?'2?? 
Deferred income taxes 264,514 
Commitment 68,200 
Total l i a b i l i t i e s ~ 
2,223,828 
Stockholders' Equity: 
Common stock; no par, stated value $100 
authorized 50,000 shares, issued and ' 
outstanding 1,000 shares 
Additional paid-in capital 100,000 
Retained earnings (deficit) 2,221 
(99.188) 
Total stockholders' equitv 
3.033 
Total Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity
 $ 2 > 2 2 6 g61 
The accompanying notes are an integral 
part of the financial statements. 
HARPER CONTRACTING, INC. 
STATEMENTS OF (LOSS) AND RETAINED EARNINGS (DEFICIT) 
For the Period From May 10. 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987 
INCOME: 
Contracting income $8,466,577 
Direct costs 7,438,087 
Gross profit 1,028,490 
EXPENSES: 
General and administrative 1,060,545 
Interest 67,131 
1,127,676 
Net operating (loss) (99,186) 
OTHER INCOME: 
Interest income 7,298 
(Loss) before provision for income taxes (91,888) 
Income tax (expense) (7,300) 
Net (Loss) $ (99,188) 
Retained earnings, beginning of period $ -0-
Add: Net (loss) (99,188) 
Retained earnings (deficit), end of period $ (99,188) 
The accompanying notes are an integral 
part of the financial statements. 
HARPER CONTRACTING, INC. 
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION 
For the Period From May'10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987 
Funds Provided: 
From operations: 
Net (loss) $ (99,188) 
Items which do not use (provide) 
working capital: 
Depreciation 303,700 
Deferred income taxes 36,500 
Working capital provided by operations 241,012 
From other sources: 
Note payable-related entity 708,000 
Long-term debt borrowings 203,977 
Issuance of common stock 102,221 
Total funds provided 1,255,210 
Funds Applied: 
Acquisition of building and equipment 153,754 
Current maturities and repayment of 
long-term debt 297,743 
Long-term assets less long-term liabilities 
spun off from Harper Excavating, Inc. 671,973 
Total funds applied 1,123,470 
Increase in Working Capital $ 131,740 
Changes in Components of Working Capital: 
Increase (decrease) in current assets: 
Cash $ 38,683 
Accounts receivable 999,737 
Costs and estimated earnings in excess of 
billings on uncompleted contracts 150,616 
Receivables from related entities 125,818 
1,314,854 
(Increase) decrease in current liabilities: 
Accounts payable 118,419 
Accrued expenses 16,370 
Billings in excess of costs and estimated 
earnings on uncompleted contracts 138,311 
Payables to related entities 342,678 
Deferred income taxes - current 220,300 
Current portion of long-term debt 347,036 
1,183,114 
Increase in Working Capital $ 131,740 
HARPER CONTRACTING, INC, 
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
1. Summary of Significant 'Accounting Policies 
a. Business Information 
On May 10, 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. performed a tax free 
reorganization pursuant to section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
As part of this reorganization, three new corporations were formed. 
At the close of business on May 9, 1986 Harper Excavating, Inc. 
transferred at book value all fixed assets and liabilities relating 
to the construction operations to Harper Contracting, Inc., in 
exchange for 1,000 shares of Harper Contracting, Inc. no par common 
stock. Harper Excavating, Inc. then changed its corporate name to 
Harper Investments, Inc. and Harper Investments, Inc. changed its 
corporate name to Harper Excavating, Inc. The Company was organized 
to carry on excavation operations. 
b. Building, Equipment and Depreciation 
Building and equipment are stated at cost. Depreciation is provided 
on the straight-line method on the estimated useful service lives of 
the various classes of assets. The building is depreciated over 15 
years and equipment over a 3 to 8 year period. Major replacements 
which extend the useful lives of equipment are capitalized and 
depreciated over the remaining useful life. Normal maintenance and 
repair items are charged to costs and expenses as incurred. 
The Company uses accelerated methods of depreciation for income tax 
purposes. These methods provide more depreciation expense in the 
early years than in the later years of the life of the asset. 
Upon the retirement or disposal of equipment, the costs and related 
accumulated depreciation amounts are eliminated and any gain or loss 
is included in operations in the year of disposition. 
c. Accounting for Construction Contracts 
The Company records revenues on construction contracts on the 
percentage-of-completion method. Contract revenues are accrued based 
upon the ratio of incurred costs to date to total estimated contract 
costs . Changes to total estimated contract costs and losses, i f any, 
are recognized in the period they are determined. Revenues 
recognized in excess of amounts billed are classif ied as current 
assets . Amounts bil led in excess of revenues recognized to date are 
c l a s s i f i e d as current l i a b i l i t i e s . It i s anticipated that sub-
stantial ly a l l contract work in progress at February 28, 1987 will be 
bil led and collected in the next f iscal year. 
Harper Contracting, Inc. 
Notes to Financial Statements - continued 
The Company repdrts revenues on construction contracts on the 
percentage-of-completion capitalized-cost method for income tax 
purposes. Under this method, 40 percent of the items with respect to 
long term contracts are taken into account under the percentage-of-
completion method and 60 percent of the items are taken into account 
under the completed-contract method. 
2. Receivables/Payables with Related Entities 
Receivables from the Parent Company at February 28, 1987, represents 
receivables for cash deposits made into the Parent Company cash accounts. 
Payables to the Parent Company represents amounts due for management fees 
charged and other miscellaneous expenses paid for by the Parent Company. 
Payables to other wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Parent Company 
represents rental charged for the use of trucks, fuel, repairs and 
maintenance, sand and gravel purchases and the hauling of material. 
Following is a schedule of the receivables/payables with related entities: 
Receivables Payables 
Parent Company $125,818 $ 86,795 
Other wholly-owned subsidiaries 
of the Parent Company — 255,883 
$125,818 $ 342,678 
The amounts receivable/payable are non interest bearing and are expected 
to be collected/paid in 1987. 
3. Income Taxes 
Provision for income taxes is made based on earnings reported in the 
financial statements for the amount of income taxes payable currently and 
in the future (deferred income taxes). Deferred taxes arise from 
computing depreciation using accelerated methods and the percentage-of-
completion capitalized-cost method of recognizing revenue on construction 
contracts for tax purposes. Deferred taxes attributable to the 
percentage-of-completion capitalized-cost method of accounting are 
recorded as a current liability and amounts attributable to accelerated 
depreciation are shown as long-term. 
Harper Contracting, Inc. 
Notes to Financial Statements - continued 
The (provision) benefit for income taxes consists of the following: 
Current income taxes: 
Federal provision $ — 
State provision — 
Current income tax (expense) — 
Deferred tax (expense) (7,300) 
(Provision) benefit for 
income taxes $ (7,300) 
The current year loss of the Company will be made available as an offset 
against other taxable income by filing a consolidated tax return with its 
Parent Company and other wholly-owned subsidiaries for the current year. 
4. Note Payable - Related Entity 
The Company entered into a promissory note agreement on June 12, 1986 with 
its Parent Company for funds advanced it at the inception of the Company. 
The note is a continuously adjustable revolving loan with the maximum 
amount of borrowings not to exceed $708,000. The interest rate is based 
on the applicable federal rate for ten year loans that is in effect in the 
month of January in the year preceding the year each payment is due. 
The unpaid principal balance at February 28, 1987 is $708,000 and is due 
June, 1996. The note is secured by the Company's accounts receivable. 
5. Long-Term Debt 
Long-term debt obligations at February 28, 1987 consist of the following: 
10% - 13.8% notes payable, due in 
monthly installments of $15,377 
including interest due at various 
times through November 1990, 
secured by equipment. $178,588 
Prime + 1% note, due in monthly 
installments of $2,646 including 
interest due May 1988, secured 
by equipment• 34,351 
Prime + 1% note, due in monthly 
installments of $10,168 including 
interest due July 1989, secured 
by equipment. 245,629 
Harper Contracting, Inc. 
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12.75% note, due iii monthly 
installments of $6,853 including 
interest due March 1988, secured 
by equipment. 76,842 
Prime + .9% note, due in monthly 
installments of $2,820 plus 
interest due July 1989, secured 
by equipment. 76,140 
Total long-term debt 611,550 
Less current portion of long-term debt 347,036 
Total long-term debt excluding 
current portion $ 264,514 
Aggregate maturities of long-term debt in each of the next five years are 
as follows: 1988 - $347,035, 1989 - $166,682, 1990 - $ 77,652, 1991 -
$20,181, 1992 - $ — . 
Equipment pledged as collateral for the 
above existing debt obligations: 
Construction equipment $ 1,548,635 
Less: Accumulated depreciation 726,458 
Book value of pledged equipment $ 822,177 
Of the above book value of pledged equipment, $88,183 is also pledged as 
collateral for debt obligations of related companies. 
6. Related Party Transactions 
The Company has entered into an agreement with a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of its Parent Company to purchase sand and gravel and provide the hauling 
of materials to job sites. Sand and gravel purchases and material hauling 
expenses, pursuant to this agreement, of $3,430,932 are included in the 
financial statements as part of direct costs for the period ended February 
28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this company in the amount of 
$143,474 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related to sand and gravel 
purchases and the hauling of material. 
The Company has its equipment maintained and repaired by a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of its Parent Company. Maintenance and repairs of $770,629 are 
included in the financial statements as part of direct costs for the 
period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this 
company in the amount of $93,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related 
to repairs and maintenance. 
Harper Contracting, Inc. 
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The Company also uses' trucks owned by a wholly-owned subsidiary of its 
Parent Company. Rental expense for these trucks amounted to $9,777 and 
are included in the financial statements as part of direct costs for the 
period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to this 
company in the amount of $9,777 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) related 
to the truck rentals. 
The Company has also entered into an agreement with its Parent Company, 
whereby it pays a monthly management fee for record keeping and management 
services provided by the Parent Company. Management fees, pursuant to 
this agreement, of $747,000 are included in the financial statements for 
the period ended February 28, 1987. The Company shows a payable to its 
Parent Company in the amount of $75,000 as of February 28, 1987 (Note 2) 
related to management fees. 
7. Employee Benefit Plans 
The Company has a contributory profit sharing and retirement plan for the 
benefit of all employees who have completed one year of service (1,000 
hours) and attained the age of 25. The plan provides for normal 
retirement on the anniversary of the plan nearest the 65th birthday and 
participants become fully vested after 10 years of services. The Company 
may make contributions to the plan out of its net or cumulative earnings. 
At February 28, 1987 the Company accrued no contributions to the plan. 
8, Commitment 
The Company entered into an agreement on June 12, 1986 with its Parent 
Company to pay $800,000 due in annual installment of $80,000 together with 
accrued interest on February 25 until paid. The interest rate is based on 
the applicable federal rate for ten year loans that is in effect in the 
month of January in the year preceding the year each payment is due. Cash 
payments on the commitment will be made in the form of dividends. 
The Parent Company has a secured interest in all personal property, 
accounts receivable and equipment of the Company. 
HARPER CONTRACTING. INC. 
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Schedule 1 
HARPER CONTRACTING, INC. 
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES, 
For the Period From May 10, 1986 (Inception) Through February 28, 1987 
Advertising 
Bad debts 
Bank charges 
Insurance-general 
Insurance-health 
Management fees 
Office supplies 
Taxes, l icenses and permits 
Telephone and u t i l i t i e s 
Miscellaneous 
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES 
$ 40 
108,589 
154 
164,743 
22,417 
747,000 
1,609 
6,393 
38 
9,562 
$1,060,545 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HALES SAND & GRAVEL, INC., 
Petitioner, 
AUDIT DIVISION OF THE STATE TAX 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
No. 910008 
FILED: November 12, 1992 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
ATTORNEYS: 
David Nuffer, Lyle R. Drake, E. Scott 
Awerkamp, St. George, for Hales Sand and 
Gravel 
R. Paul Van Dam, Brian L. Tarbet, Salt Lake 
City, for State Tax Commission 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This is a proceeding to review a sales tax 
deficiency assessment by the Utah State Tax 
Commission. Hales Sand and Gravel, Inc., 
petitions for review of the Commission's order 
requiring Hales to pay sales tax on 
transportation costs incurred in the delivery of 
building materials to its customers. We affirm 
the Commission's deficiency assessment but 
reverse the negligence penalty it assessed Hales 
for nonpayment. 
Because a party seeking review of an order of 
an administrative agency must demonstrate that 
the agency's factual determinations are not 
supported by substantial evidence, we state the 
facts and all legitimate inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
agency's findings. Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 15-16 (Oct. 27, 1992); 
First Nat'I Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 
1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). We state the facts in 
this case accordingly. 
Hales is a Utah corporation with its principal 
office in Redmond, Utah. Its primary business 
involves retail sales of sand, gravel, asphalt, and 
concrete. Purchasers may pick these materials 
up themselves; however, during the period at 
issue, approximately 95 percent of Hales' gravel 
purchasers and 70 percent of its asphalt 
purchasers had Hales deliver their orders. When 
a customer elected to have the materials 
delivered, Hales either delivered the materials in 
its own trucks or arranged for transportation by 
a common carrier and billed the customer for 
lv. Rep. 3 Q 
the carrier's charges. If Hales delivered the 
material itself, its transportation charges were 
commensurate with those a common carrier 
would have charged. 
Before March 1, 1987, Hales collected and 
remitted sales tax on the total charge for 
materials and transportation. After March 1, 
1987, Hales recorded and invoiced material and 
transportation charges separately, collecting and 
remitting tax only on charges for materials, not 
on transportation charges. Hales employed this 
bifurcated method of record keeping and 
invoicing for all its sales, including sales to JTN 
Construction, Inc., a Utah corporation that three 
of Hales' four shareholders established to 
perform federal contracts.1 Nor did Hales collect 
or remit sales tax for the "small-batch charges" 
it added to concrete batches that were too small 
to absorb the costs of delivery. 
After an audit of Hales' records for the period 
of January of 1985 to December of 1987, the 
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission determined that under section 
59-12-103(l)(a) and (b) of the Code, Hales 
should have collected and remitted sales taxes on 
its transportation charges after March 1, 1987, 
including the charges for small batches and for 
delivery to JTN. See Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-103(l)(a), (b). The total deficiency 
assessed was $128,792.49, which included a 
negligence penalty of $9,712.82. See id. 
§§59-M01(3)(a), -12-110(5). 
Hales contested the assessment, claiming that 
its transportation charges were exempt from 
sales tax. The Commission rejected Hales' 
claim, reasoning as follows: First, the 
Commission decided that Hales did not qualify 
for a tax exemption under section 59-12-104, 
which exempts "intrastate movements of freight 
and express or street railway fares" from Utah's 
sales and use taxes. See id. §59-12-104(18) 
(1987) (amended 1991) (current version at 
§59-12-104(17)). The Commission interpreted 
the provision as applying only to common 
carriers. Second, the Commission decided that 
under its rule 865-19-7IS, Hales did not pass 
title to its gravel, sand, concrete, and asphalt 
until it delivered the materials to its customers. 
This rule provides in relevant part that unless 
otherwise agreed, title passes on delivery when 
a sales contract requires delivery at a particular 
place. See Utah Admin. R. 865-19-71S. The 
Commission concluded that since Hales 
completed its performance only upon delivery, 
its transportation costs should be considered part 
of the price of the sale and the entire transaction 
should be subject to sales tax. See Utah Code 
Ann. §59-12-103(l)(a), (b). Because Hales had 
collected sales tax only on the purchase price of 
its materials, the Commission assessed Hales 
sales tax for the transportation costs. 
The Commission also considered two related 
matters. First, Hales claimed that it should not 
have had to collect or remit sales tax for the 
small-batch charges it added to concrete 
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orders that were too small to absorb delivery 
costs. The Commission disagreed, finding that 
the small-batch charges were essentially nothing 
more than transportation charges, which 
therefore were subject to sales tax. Second, 
Hales argued that the Commission should credit 
it for taxes it had paid on sales to JTN that were 
made before March 1, 1987, because the Utah 
Department of Transportation bad determined 
that Hales and JTN were the same entity for the 
purposes of federal labor law. Again the 
Commission disagreed, finding that Hales and 
JTN were separate legal entities and that their 
transactions were subject to sales tax. In sum, I 
the Commission assessed Hales $41,739.95 for 
total sales tax due and $9,712 as a negligence 
penalty.2 
Before our court, Hales challenges all aspects 
of the Commission's order. See id. 
§78-2-2(3)(e)(ii). Before examining Hales' 
claims, we note the applicable standards of I 
review. This review presents questions of both 
law and fact. As provided by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), we 
grant deference to an agency *s factual findings 
and will overturn those findings only if the 
petitioner marshals the facts and shows that in I 
light of the record as a whole, the agency's 
findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence. See id. §63-46b-16(4)(g); First Nat'l 
Bank of Boston, 799 P.2d at 1165. On the other 
hand, we grant no such deference to the 
agency's interpretation or application of law, I 
which we review for correctness.3 Utah Code I 
Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(d); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991); 
Savage Indus, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 
P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 1991). With these 
standards in mind, we turn to the merits of this I 
case. I 
We begin with Hales' first contention-thatthe I 
Commission erred when it limited the section 
59-12-104(18) tax exemption to common I 
carriers. That section reads as follows: I 
The following sales and uses are exempt 
from the taxes imposed by this chapter: 
. . . , I 
(18) intrastate movements of freight and 
express or street railway fares[.] 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(18). Hales argues 
that the provision's plain language exempting 
intrastate "movements of freight" is not limited 
to common carriers but should extend to all 
transportation costs. We disagree. 
In construing a statute, we view it as a I 
comprehensive whole, not as an unrelated 
collection of provisions. See Silver v. Auditing 
D/v., 820 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1991); Amax 
Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990); Peay v. 
Board of Ed. ofProvo Gty Schools, 14 Utah 2d 
63, 66, 377 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 1962). 
Applying this principle to the statute before us, 
we look first to section 59-12-103, which 
#t„> cai*<j tax from which Hales seeks 
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amounts paid to "common earners" for "all" 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-103( l ) (b) . While the section 
59-12-104(18) exemption for intrastate 
transportation of freight does not mention 
common carriers, it is a logical inference that 
the legislature imposed the general tax on 
common carriers in section 59-12-103(l)(b) and 
then sought to limit its application to cotmnon 
carriers in section 59-12-104(18). 
Other provisions in the statutes have a similar 
structure of a general imposition of tax followed 
by specific limitations. For example, although 
section 59-12-103 taxes "meals sold," id. 
§59-12-103(l)(e), section 59-12-104 exempts 
airline food and certain vending machine food 
sales from the "meals sold" tax, id. 
§59-12-104(3), (4). This pattern supports the 
inference that the legislature intended section 
59-12-104(18) to do nothing more than limit the 
I tax specifically imposed on common carriers. 
Although we generally construe taxing statutes 
in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing 
authority, we construe statutes providing tax 
exemptions strictly against the taxpayer. Parson 
Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n> 
617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980). We therefore 
construe section 59-12-104(18) agamst Hales. 
Because the construction that limits the 
exemption to common carriers finds logical 
support in the structure of the statute, we reject 
Hales' broader gloss. We hold that section 
I 59-12-104(18)'s sales tax exemption is limited to 
I common carriers. Utah Code Ann. 
J §59-12-104(18). Because Hales is not a common 
carrier, it is not entitled to the benefits of the 
exemption. 
We next turn to Hales' contention that even 
I without the exemption, its transportation charges 
J were not subject to sales tax. The provision at 
J issue is section 59-12-103(l)(a), which reads as 
follows: 
I (1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser 
I for the amount paid or charged for the 
following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal 
property made within the state[.] 
Id. §59-12-103(1 )(a). Hales claims that its 
asphalt, sand, concrete, and gravel sales were 
completed at its pit or plant and that therefon 
any transportation charges accrued after the sale 
were complete. In other words, it argues tha 
title to the merchandise passed at the point o 
sale instead of at delivery and that it had n 
I obligation to collect and remit sales tax on tfa 
transportation charges. 
Hales' argument breaks into two subsidiai 
issues. First, what is the proper legal standai 
for determining passage of title? Secon 
applying that standard, is the Commission 
finding that Hales did not pass title until delive 
J correct? We take each question in turn. 
We begin with the common ground. Be 
Hales and the Commission agree that passage 
J title is the moment upon which the transaction 
*~
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transportation charges are taxable if the)' are 
incurred before the transfer of title because this 
increases the total selling price; transportation 
charges are not taxable if they are incurred after 
the passage of title because they are not part of 
the taxed sales transaction. While the text pf the 
sales tax statute does not mention such a test, 
see id. §59-12-103, this court has interpreted the 
predecessor statute as hinging taxability on the 
passage of title.4 See Whitehill Sand & Gravel 
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 106 Utah 469, 472, 
150 P.2d 370, 371 (1944); see also Ford J. 
Tmits Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 106 
Utah 343, 348, 148 P.2d 343, 345 (1944). In 
fact, the Commission has promulgated a rule 
adopting the passage-of-title test for fixing the 
moment for determining the tax. See Utah 
Admin. R. 865-19-71S. 
While Hales and the Commission agree that 
passage of title determines the taxability of the 
transportation charges, they differ as to who has 
the burden of proving the point of passage. Each 
contends that Whitehill requires the other to 
prove when title passed. The Commission argues 
that title passes to the buyer on delivery unless 
the seller produces evidence to the contrary. 
Hales insists that Whitehill requires the 
Commission to prove that title passed on 
delivery by producing evidence in support of its 
conclusion. Because the Commission did not 
produce such evidence here, Hales argues, this 
court should presume that title passed at the 
point of shipment. We disagree with Hales for 
two reasons. First, we are unconvinced that 
Whitehill stands for the proposition Hales 
asserts. Second, even if Whitehill did establish a 
rebuttable presumption that title passes at 
shipment, Utah's adoption of the Uniform 
Commercial Code overruled its holding and 
established a new test for passage of title under 
which it is clear that Hales passed title to its 
merchandise at delivery, not before. We discuss 
these points in turn. 
We first address Hales' interpretation of 
Whitehill. In Whitehill, the plaintiff showed that 
in some of the transactions included in a 
deficiency tax assessment, the parties had 
contracted explicitly to pass title at point of 
shipment, before the materials were transported 
to the customer. 106 Utah at 474-75, 150 P.2d 
at 372. The court concluded that while the 
Commission correctly assessed sales tax 
deficiencies for two transactions where the 
parties had agreed that title would pass at 
delivery, id. at 475, 150 P.2d at 372, in the 
majority of the transactions, the facts were not 
so clear cut, id. at 475,150 P.2d at 372-73. The 
court set aside the assessment and remanded for 
a rehearing on the question of when title passed 
in those ambiguous transactions. In so doing, it 
held that the Commission could not infer that 
title had passed on delivery from the mere fact 
that invoices listed the pit price plus delivery 
charge as a single item, with the sales tax 
applied only to the pit price for the sand or 
gravel. Id. at 475 K O P ^ «• ITI 
Notwithstanding this holding, it is important to 
note that for some of its transactions, the 
taxpayer in Whitehill had adduced evidence of an 
explicit agreement to pass title at the point of 
shipment. Consequently, the Whitehill court may 
not have meant that in the absence of any 
evidence as to the parties' intent, it would infer 
that title passed on shipment. Instead, its refusal 
to infer that title had passed on delivery may 
stem solely from the fact that Whitehill had 
produced some evidence rebutting that 
presumption. We reject Hales' contention that 
Whitehill prohibits an inference that title passes 
at shipment. 
Second, even if Whitehill established a 
rebuttable presumption that title passes on 
shipment, which we do not think it did, Utah's 
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (the 
"UCC") overruled WhitehiWs holding by 
creating a new test for determining passage of 
title. Section 70A-2-401 (2) provides: 
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title 
passes to the buyer at the time and place at 
which the seller completes his performance 
with reference to the physical delivery of the 
goods, despite any reservation of a security 
interest and even though a document of title 
is to be delivered at a different time or 
place; and in particular and despite any 
reservation of a security interest by the bill 
of lading 
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes 
the seller to send the goods to the buyer but 
does not require him to deliver them at 
destination, title passes to the buyer at the 
time and place of shipment; but 
(b) if the contract requires delivery at 
destination, title passes on tender there. 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-401(2). This section 
establishes a new test in cases where the parties 
have not "explicitly agreed" when title shall 
pass. This test hinges the passage of title on 
whether the contract requires delivery at 
destination. Cf. O'Kelley-Eccles Co. v. State, 
324 P.2d 683, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). 
Because a purchase agreement will always either 
specify or not specify delivery at destination, the 
Whitehill presumption is irrelevant. In adopting 
the UCC, the legislature declared that when a 
contract requires delivery at destination, title 
passes at destination unless the parties explicitly 
agree otherwise. See Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-2-401(2). This is the test applicable to this 
case. This is also the test, codified in the 
Commission's rules, that the Commission 
applied in determining that Hales did not pass 
title to its merchandise until delivery. See Utah 
Admin. R. 865-19-71S(B)(l), (3). 
Having determined that the Commission 
applied the correct legal test to Hales' case, we 
next review its finding that Hales did not pass 
title until delivery. As an initial matter, we note 
that Hales anticipated our analysis under section 
70A-2-401(2) and has argued that its sales 
contracts did not "require" delivery at 
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because its customers could elect to collect their 
orders at the pit or plant. Therefore, it contends, 
title to its merchandise passed at shipment under 
section 70A-2-401(2). We disagree. Once a 
customer elected to have the material delivered 
rather than picking it up, Hales and the customer 
had a contract for delivery at destination. See 
East Brewton Materials, Inc. v. State Dep't of 
Revenue, 233 So. 2d 751, 757 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1970); TOBI Transp., Inc. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 163 Cal. Rptr. 778, 780 (Ct. App. 
1980); Santa Clara Sand & Gravel Co. v. State 
Bd. of Equalization, 37 Cal. Rptr. 506, 508-09 
(Ct. App. 1964); O'Kelley-Eccles Co., 324P.2d 
at 686. Absent an explicit agreement to the 
contrary, title to Hales' materials passed when 
Hales fulfilled its contract and made delivery. 
See Santa Clara Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Cal. 
Rptr. at 508-09, 511. 
As an alternative challenge to the 
Commission's findings, Hales argues that the 
transactions in question satisfy the first line of 
section 70A-2-401(2)~wunless otherwise 
explicitly provided"-because the purchase 
orders show an agreement between Hales and its 
customers to pass title at the point of shipment. 
As evidence, Hales submitted several purchase 
orders and invoices showing separate entries for 
costs of materials and transportation. These 
separate entries do not prove a bilateral 
agreement to pass title at shipment instead of 
delivery, as required by section 70A-2-401(2). 
Under the UAPA, Hales has the burden of 
demonstrating that no substantial evidence 
supports the Commission's finding that no 
explicit bilateral agreement existed on the 
subject of title transfer. See Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-16(4)(g); First Nat'I Bank of Boston, 
799 P.2d at 1165. The invoices and purchase 
orders it submitted may be firm evidence of 
Hales' own intent to pass title at pomt of 
shipment; however, without more, they do not 
prove an explicit agreement by the customers to 
take title at the point of shipment. Because 
unilateral subjective intent does not prove 
explicit agreement between the parties to pass 
title at point of shipment, see Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-2-401(2); O'Kelley-Eccles Co., 324 P.2d 
at 686, Hales has failed to marshal the facts to 
show that the Commission's finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence. See First 
Nat'l Bank of Boston, 799 P.2d at 1165. 
Consequently, we affirm the Commission's 
finding that Hales did not pass title until 
delivery. Because it did not pass title until 
delivery, Hales was obligated to collect and 
remit sales tax on its transportation charges. 
In its brief, Hales points to several foreign 
cases, arguing that other jurisdictions have held 
that title passes at or before shipment. Hales is 
correct as to the holdings of these cases; 
however, they have been rendered in 
circumstances far different from those in the 
present case. The court in Revenue Cabinet v. 
rnrum A Edwards. Inc., 673 S.W.2d 736 (Ky. 
Provo, Utah 1 
that title passed before delivery on the umque 
nature of ready-mix concrete, which spoils if the 
customer rejects delivery. Because of ready-mix 
concrete's short lifespan, industry custom and 
practice recognize that title passes when the 
ingredients are mixed. Id. at 739. The court 
explicitly noted that it was basing its 
determination on the custom of the industry, not 
on Kentucky's version of section 70A-2-401(2), 
id., thereby implying that but for the custom of 
the particular industry, title would have passed 
at deliveiy under Kentucky's counterpart to 
section 70A-2-401(2). This implication bolsters 
the Commission's position in this case because 
in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute 
did not impose a test for passage of title, and an 
administrative rule did impose a test for passage 
of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes nc 
claim that the impermanence of its material! 
results in a generally understood, implici 
agreement to pass title at some point befon 
delivery. Moreover, our statute requires ai 
explicit agreement on passage of title before th< 
statutory presumption can be rebutted; there i 
no obvious provision in this statute for aj 
implicit understanding, which the Kentuck 
court thought sufficient. Consequently, the fact 
of Revenue Cabinet are inapposite and its resu 
is inapplicable to the case at bar.5 See also Kurt 
Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 85f 
862 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (holding that tit] 
passes on mixture of ready-mix concrete becaui 
of usage of trade). 
We hold that the Commission applied tl 
correct legal test in finding that Hales did n 
pass title until delivery and therefore wi 
required to collect and remit sales taxes on i 
transportation costs. 
We next consider Hales' contention that ev< 
if the Commission's order was correct 
general, Hales' small-batch charges and sales 
JTN should not be subject to sales tax and tt 
the Commission should credit Hales for a 
taxes it paid on sales to JTN before March 
1987. We take the small-batch and JTN issues 
turn. 
The small-batch question can be disposed 
quickly. Hales admits that the small-ba! 
charge is, in essence, a transportation chai 
added to the price of batches of concrete that i 
too small to absorb the cost of delivery. Un< 
the passage of title analysis outlined abo 
therefore, small-batch charges are taxable unl 
the parties explicitly agree otherwise. Hales ] 
produced no evidence of such agreement. 1 
case it cites in support of exempting small-b* 
charges from taxation is inapposite because 
relies on an explicit statutory exemption of 
freight charges. See Maryland Redi-Mix, Inc 
Comptroller of the Treasury, Sales Tax No. 2 
1985 WL 6114 (Md. Tax Aug. 2, 19! 
Because Utah has no comparable statute or r 
Maryland Redi-Mix is of no assistance. See S 
v. Anderton, 69 Utah 53, 63, 252 P. 280, 
(1926). 
kdv Rep. 3 
Similarly unconvincing is Hales' contention 
that transfers of materials to JTN should not be 
taxable. Hales paid taxes on sales to JTN before 
March 1, 1987, but now seeks reimbursement of 
those payments and a tax exemption for later 
payments because, it says, the two corporations 
are the same entity for tax purposes. Hales bases 
its argument on the fact that the Utah 
Department of Transportation, as instructed by 
the United States Department of Labor, found 
that JTN and Hales should be considered a 
single construction subcontractor for the 
purposes of setting the salaries of employees 
performing federal contracts as required by the 
Davis-Bacon Act. See 40 U.S.C. §§276a to 
276a-5. Because the Utah Department of 
Transportation considers Hales and JTN to be a 
single entity for purposes of federal contracts, 
Hales argues, this court should estop the State of 
Utah from assessing sales tax against Hales for 
sales to JTN. 
This position lacks support from either state or 
federal law. First, we have never held that one 
agency's determination is binding on the 
deliberations of another agency. In fact, under 
the UAPA, an agency's determinations are not 
even binding on that agency itself, so long as the 
agency justifies its departure from prior practice 
by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency. See 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46(b)-16(h)(iii); see also 
BJ-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 183 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 20, 26 (Mar. 31, 1992). As the 
Commission points out in its brief, "If an 
administrative body is not bound by its own 
prior determinations, that agency certainly 
should not be constrained by the determinations 
of a different agency." 
Second, federal labor law criteria are simply 
irrelevant to a determination of state taxability.6 
As this court stated in 1964, "[T]he impact of 
federal requirements on the operations of 
plaintiff do not affect Utah's power to tax sales 
of services and property where title and delivery 
pass[] within the state." Ogden Union Ry. <£ 
Depot Co. v. State Tax Comm 7i, 16 Utah 2d 23, 
28, 395 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah 1964). 
Third, the Davis-Bacon Act protects 
employees, not their employers. "As a basic 
proposition, it is settled that contractors can 
claim no legal rights growing solely out of 
Davis-Bacon Act minimum wage determinations 
by the Secretary of Labor, for such provisions 
are not incorporated in the contract for their 
benefit." Morrison-Hardeman-Perine-Leavell v. 
United States, 392 F.2d 988, 995 (Ct. CI. 
1968). Because Hales' position seems to lack 
any legal basis, we affirm both the 
Commission's refusal to reimburse Hales for tax 
paid on transactions with JTN before March 1, 
1987, and the Commission's deficiency 
assessment against Hales for JTN transactions 
after March 1, 1987. 
The final issue is whether Hales should be 
liable for a 10-percent negligence penalty for 
failing to collect and remit taxes on its sales 
since March 1, 1987. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§59-1-401 (3)(a), -12-110(5). A 10-percent 
negligence penalty is appropriate when the 
taxpayer has failed to pay taxes and a reasonable 
investigation into the applicable rules and 
statutes would have revealed that the taxes were 
due. A 15-percent penalty for intentional 
disregard of the law is imposed when the 
taxpayer has failed to pay taxes, a reasonable 
investigation into the applicable rules and 
statutes would have revealed that the taxes were 
due, and the Commission has informed the 
taxpayer that the taxes were due. See id. 
§59-1-401 (3)(b); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 
21-22 (Sept. 30, 1992). In both instances, the 
taxpayer can escape the penalty if he or she can 
show that he or she based the nonpayment of 
taxes on a legitimate, good faith interpretation of 
an arguable point of law. Cf. Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Co., 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21-22. 
Applying this standard to the facts before us, 
we find that Hales should not be subject to the 
negligence penalty because it based its 
nonpayment of taxes on a legitimate, good faith 
interpretation of an arguable point of law. Hales 
advanced two primary reasons for its 
nonpayment of taxes. First, it argued that its 
transportation charges were exempt from sales 
tax; second, it argued that title to its 
merchandise passed at the point of shipment and 
that therefore transportation costs were not part 
of the price of the sale. Although we find that 
Hales' reliance on the second ground was 
neither reasonable nor legitimate,7 we do 
recognize that the statute listing the sales tax 
exemptions presented a potential ambiguity as to 
the scope of the exemption for intrastate 
movements of freight, which may have misled 
Hales. See Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(18) 
(1987) (amended 1991) (current version at 
§59-12-104(17)). The Commission recognized as 
much in its hearing memorandum. Because of 
the existence of this ambiguity, we reverse the 
$9,712 negligence penalty assessed against 
Hales. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
1. The record suggests that the shareholders formed 
JTN to avoid paying Hales' employees the higher, 
federally mandated wages required of companies 
performing federal contracts. See The Davis-Bacon 
Act, 40 U.S.C. §§276ato 276a-5. 
2. The parties stipulated to these amounts before the 
Commission. The record is unclear as to why these 
amounts differ from those initially assessed against 
Hales by the Auditing Division. 
3 . We recently have indicated that we will grant 
intermediate deference to an agency's interpretation or 
application of specific laws when the legislature has 
exnl i e i f lv r>r imnlir»itKf AaA*~~*~** -»* -* 
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agency to interpret or apply that law. See Morton 
lnt% Inc v Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 
1991). Because here there is no explicit delegation of 
discretion and because the questions at issue are of 
general law and specific statutory construction on 
which the Commission's experience and expertise will 
be of no real assistance, see Sandy City v. Salt Lake 
County, 827 P.2d 212, 218 (Utah 1992), Chris <* 
Dick's Lumber v. Tax Comm'n,19\ P.2d 511, 513-14 
(Utah 1990), we do not apply the standard of 
intermediate deference to the legal issues in this case. 
SeeZissi, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 n.2, Morton, 814 
P.2d at 588-89. 
4. The predecessor to the taxation statute differs 
slightly from that at issue here, but both Hales and the 
Commission agree that the differences are 
insignificant. 
5. The other cases Hales cites are equally 
unconvincing. The court in Clarion Ready Mixed 
Concrete Co. v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 107 
N W.2d 553 (Iowa 1961), exempted transportation 
costs from sales tax in a situation totally unlike that 
before us There, the statutory exemption for 
transportation costs was not limited to common 
carriers, the state did not recognize passage of title as 
the pivotal fact for determining taxability, the 
merchandise was perishable ready-mix concrete 
instead of the comparatively permanent materials at 
issue in the instant case, and the court found that both 
the buyer and the seller intended that the contracts for 
sale and transportation be independent. Id. at 556-58. 
Because of these distinctions, Clarion offers little 
guidance in resolving this case Similarly, the court in 
In re Sales dc Use Tax Determination, 225 N.W 2d 
571 (N.D. 1974), held only that incidental but 
separate bargaining for transportation costs implies an 
agreement to pass title at the point of shipment. Id. at 
574, 576, 578. Because Hales has adduced no 
evidence of separate bargaining for transportation 
costs, In re Sales does not aid its argument. 
6. Although we make no ruling on this issue, federal 
labor law criteria probably are also irrelevant to a 
determination of federal taxability. In concluding that 
JTN and Hales should be treated as one entity because 
of their shared equipment, facilities, records, 
management, and employees, the Department of 
Labor took pains to emphasize that the factors relevant 
to its determination were completely independent of 
those "that may be of paramount importance to other 
governmental agencies, such as the Internal Revenue 
Service . . . ." Letter from Arthur M. Kerschner, Jr., 
Employment Standards Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, 
to E. Jane Casper, Conduction Div., Utah Dep't of 
Transp. (Aug 3, 1989) (emphasis added). 
7. The law extant in March of 1987, the month Hales 
stopped collecting and remitting sales taxes, made 
clear that taxation of transportation charges depended 
on passage of title, see Whitehill, 106 Utah at 472, 
150 P.2d at 371, and that absent an explicit agreement 
to the contrary, title passed on delivery, see Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-2-401(2). Moreover, the first edition 
of the Utah Administrative Code, which went into 
effect July 1, 1987—only five months after Hales 
stopped collecting and remitting taxes—not only 
presented the Commission's rules for passage of title, 
but also provided examples of how those rules would 
beapplied. See Utah Admin. R. 865-72S-1 (1987-88). 
\J IXC1I1J 
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Metropolitan Property & Liability 
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ATTORNEYS: 
L. Rich Humpherys, Karra J. Porter, Salt 
Lake City, for Richard Nielsen 
Glenn C. Hanni, Barbara L. Maw, Salt Lake 
City, for Metropolitan Property 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Richard H. Nielsen appeals the 
judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
that $250,000 is the maximum recovery possible 
under the uninsured motorist provision of an 
insurance policy issued by defendant 
Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co. 
("Metropolitan"). We affirm. 
The facts of this case are undisputed. Prior to 
April of 1983, Nielsen purchased an insurance 
policy from Metropolitan. The policy insured 
two automobiles owned by Nielsen and was in 
force at all relevant times. Among other 
coverages, the policy included uninsured 
motorist protection with a limit of $250,000 for 
"each person" and $500,000 for "each accident." 
Metropolitan charged a separate premium foi 
each vehicle. 
On April 28, 1983, Nielsen and his son were 
involved in an automobile accident with twe 
uninsured motorists, Mark O'Reilly and Linda 
French. As a result of the accident, both Nielsei 
and his son sustained personal injuries and file< 
claims with Metropolitan. Metropolitan settle* 
the claim of Nielsen's son and made a partia 
payment of $1,707 to Nielsen. However, n 
settlement was reached on the remaining portio 
of Nielsen's claim. Ultimately, Nielsen filed su 
against Metropolitan, O'Reilly, and Frencl 
seeking an apportionment of fault and 
determination of Nielsen's damages an 
Metropolitan's liability. 
rsieisen v 
200 Utah / 
INSTITUTIONAL LAUNDRY, INC. V. UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
1066 Utah 706 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ants' failure to comply with Rule 2.9(b) of 
the Rules of Practice in the District Courts 
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah. 
Rule 2.9(b) states: 
Copies of the proposed Findings, Judg-
ments, and/or Orders shall be served on 
opposing counsel before being presented 
to the court for signature unless the 
court otherwise orders. Notice of objec-
tions thereto shall be submitted to the 
court within (5) days after service. 
Compliance with Rule 2.9(b) is necessary 
in order that a judgment be "filed" as we 
have construed that term under Rule 
58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Larsen v. Larsen, Utah, 674 P.2d 
116, 117 (1983); Bigelow v. Ingersoll, Utah, 
618 P.2d 50, 52 (1980). The record indi-
cates that no copies of the proposed judg-
ment and findings were sent to counsel for 
plaintiffs, and there is nothing in the trial 
transcript to show that the trial court 
waived that requirement. Therefore, no 
judgment has been "filed" within the mean-
ing of the Rule, and this appeal is prema-
ture. Utah R. Civil P., Rules 58A(c) and 
72(a). 
The appeal is dismissed, and the case is 
remanded to the trial court for a proper 
filing of the judgment in compliance with 
Rule 2.9(b), from which plaintiffs may take 
a timely appeal if they so desire. 
INSTITUTIONAL LAUNDRY, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 19390. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 26, 1985. 
Subsidiary corporation brought action 
challenging sales tax assessment for laun-
dry services provided by it to parent corpo-
ration. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., upheld 
sales tax assessment, and subsidiary ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court held that sub-
sidiary, with separate corporate existence, 
was liable for sales tax in regard to laun-
dry services provided for parent corpora-
tion on nonprofit basis. 
Affirmed. 
1. Corporations <3=>1.5(3) 
Corporation, be it parent or subsidiary, 
has its own legal identity and existence, 
and common ownership or control does not 
automatically destroy that separate identi-
ty. 
2. Corporations <s=»1.5(l) 
Although in appropriate cases equity 
may look through corporate shell to corpo-
ration's alter ego to prevent fraud or 
wrongdoing, general rule is that separate 
corporations are separate legal entities 
bound by obligations as well as benefits. 
3. Corporations e=>1.6(ll) 
Corporate structure will not be dis-
regarded just to facilitate tax avoidance; 
corporation may not disregard or shed its 
corporate clothing to avoid tax conse-
quences. 
4. Taxation <s=>1261 
When taxpayer has chosen to conduct 
business under particular arrangement, it 
cannot disregard consequences of that ar-
rangement when it would otherwise be to 
taxpayer's disadvantage. 
5. Taxation <3=>1261 
Subsidiary corporation was subject to 
sales tax for laundry services provided to 
parent corporation on nonprofit basis, not-
withstanding that subsidiary owned no 
property, kept no separate corporate 
records, and had same board of directors as 
parent; having elected to operate as corpo-
ration, for whatever benefits that status 
offered, subsidiary was also required to 
accept tax burdens of that status. U.C.A. 
1953, 59-l£-4(g), 59-15-5. 
6. Taxation <s=>1201 
Liability for sales tax does not depend 
upon existence of profit. 
M. Stephen Coontz, Park City, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Mark K. 
Buchi, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
respondent. 
INSTITUTIONAL LAUNDRY v. 
Ctte as 706 P-2d 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Institutional Laundry, Inc. 
(hereafter "Institutional") challenges a 
sales tax assessment by the Tax Commis-
sion for laundry services provided by Insti-
tutional to its parent corporation. 
The facts providing the basis for the 
assessment are undisputed. During 1978 
and 1979, Institutional was a Utah corpora-
tion owned 100% by Wasatch Medical 
Management Services, Inc. (hereafter 
"WMMS"), a health care provider. Institu-
tional owned no property and kept no sepa-
rate corporate records. Its board of di-
rectors was the same as the board of di-
rectors of WMMS. Institutional existed 
only for the administrative convenience of 
WMMS, providing laundry services for the 
parent on a nonprofit basis. Subsequent to 
1979, the formal corporate status of Insti-
tutional was terminated and it became a 
division of WMMS. During 1978 and 1979, 
medicare and medicaid programs reim-
bursed WMMS on a nonprofit basis for 
laundry care services received from Institu-
tional. 
Pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 59-15-4(g) 
(as amended), the State Tax Commission 
assessed sales tax for the laundry services 
that were provided from July 1978 through 
December 1979 by Institutional and 
charged to WMMS. Institutional appealed 
the assessment by filing a petition in the 
district court. On cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, Institutional^ motion was 
denied and the motion of the Tax Commis-
sion granted. We affirm the summary 
judgment. 
A sales tax is specifically imposed under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 59-15-4(g) (as amended) on 
amounts charged by Institutional for laun-
dry and dry cleaning services. The laun-
dry services performed by Institutional are 
clearly within the language of the statute. 
Institutional has the responsibility for the 
collection and remittance of the tax to the 
State Tax Commission. U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 59-15-5 (as amended). However, Institu-
tional claims that its nonprofit transactions 
with its parent corporation are not taxable. 
Although none of the statutory exemptions 
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to our sales tax under U.C.A., 1953, § 59-
15-6 (as amended) are applicable, Institu-
tional argues that as a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of WMMS, it has no real separate 
corporate existence and is therefore ex-
empt from tax. 
[1-3] A corporation, be it parent or sub-
sidiary, has its own legal identity and exist-
ence. Common ownership or control does 
not automatically destroy that separate 
identity. Although in appropriate cases eq-
uity may look through the corporate shell 
to its alter-ego to prevent fraud or wrong-
doing, the general rule still applies that 
corporations are separate legal entities 
bound by the obligations as well as the 
benefits. Surgical Supply Center v. In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, Dept of 
Employment Security, 118 Utah 632, 223 
P.2d 593, 595 (1950); Messick v. PHD 
Trucking Service, Inc, Utah, 678 P.2d 791 
(1984). The corporate structure will not be 
disregarded just to facilitate tax avoidance. 
Western States Bankcard Association v. 
City & County of San Francisco, 19 
Cal.3d 208, 137 Cal.Rptr. 183, 561 P.2d 273 
(1977). 
[4,5] Having elected to operate as a 
corporation, for whatever benefits that sep-
arate status conferred upon Institutional 
and its parent, Institutional must also ac-
cept the tax burden and responsibility at-
tendant to its corporate form. A corpora-
tion may not disregard or shed its corpo-
rate clothing to avoid tax consequences. 
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 
P.2d 57 (1964), modified on rehearing, 16 
Utah 2d 255, 399 P.2d 145 (1965); Cal-Met-
al Corp. v. California State Board of 
Equalization, 161 Cal.App.3d 759, 207 Cal. 
Rptr. 783 (1984). When a taxpayer has 
chosen to conduct business under a particu-
lar arrangement, it cannot disregard the 
consequence of that arrangement when it 
would otherwise be to the taxpayer's disad-
vantage. 19 Cal.3d at 219, 137 Cal.Rptr. 
183, 561 P.2d 273; Mercedes-Benz of North 
America, Inc. v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion, 127 Cal.App.3d 871, 179 Cal.Rptr. 758 
(1982); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State, 
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Colo., 628 P.2d 85 (1981); Simplicity Pat-
tern Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 
27 Cal.3d 900, 167 Cal.Rptr. 366, 615 P.2d 
555 (1980). 
The claim that nonprofit transactions be-
tween parent and subsidiary corporations 
are nontaxable events was settled by this 
Court in Ogden Union Railway and Depot 
Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra. In 
Ogden Union Railway, the plaintiff pro-
vided railway depot services and supplies 
on a nonprofit basis to its parent companies 
Union Pacific Railroad and Southern Pacif-
ic Company. We held that transactions 
between parent and subsidiary are within 
the purview of the sales tax notwithstand-
ing that the business of the subsidiary is 
nonprofit and exclusively with and for the 
convenience of the parent We also reject-
ed as unpersuasive the case of Valier Coal 
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 11 I11.2d 
402, 143 N.E.2d 35 (1957), upon which Insti-
tutional relies here. 16 Utah 2d at 27-28, 
395 P.2d 57. See also Superior Coal Co. 
v. Department of Finance, 377 111. 282, 36 
N.E.2d 354, 358 (1941); annot, 64 A.L.R.2d 
769 (1959). 
In addition to Valier Coal Co., appellant 
Institutional relies upon Mapo, Inc. v. 
State Board of Equalization, 53 Cal. 
App.3d 245, 125 Cal.Rptr. 727 (1975). Al-
though in Mapo the transactions between 
parent and subsidiary were exclusive and 
nonprofit, that court found other factors 
significant which are not present in the 
instant case. The sole reason for Mapo's 
existence was merely to simplify union em-
ployment agreements. All other aspects of 
the company, including payroll and manu-
facturing, were entirely controlled by the 
grandfather company, Walt Disney Produc-
tions. Also, Mapo had previously obtained 
a favorable ruling from the taxing board 
based upon California sales tax provisions 
not found in our statute. 53 Cal.App.3d at 
248-49, 125 Cal.Rptr. 727. 
[6] Institutional also argues that its 
charges for laundry services provided to 
WMMS are nontaxable to the extent 
WMMS was paid by medicare or medicaid 
on a nonprofit basis. We also rejected a 
similar contention in Ogden Union Rail-
way. 16 Utah 2d at 28, 395 P.2d 57. Lia-
bility for sales tax does not depend upon 
the existence of a profit. There was no 
state medicaid or federal medicare regula-
tion which required Institutional to limit its 
services to WMMS or imposed any price 
limitation on the amount Institutional could 
charge for its service. The only restriction 
by either medicare or medicaid was the 
amount which that program was willing to 
pay the health care provider. It was no1 
required to accept medicare or medicaid 
assistance. There is no showing by plain-
tiff that the state controlled or restricted 
Institutional^ business or activities. Insti-
tutional was free to make whatever busi-
ness arrangement it chose with WMMS or 
any other customer. 
We do not find any basis for departing 
from our prior decision and affirm the sum-
mary judgment below in favor of the State 
Tax Commission. 
